diff options
| author | Eric Andersen <andersen@codepoet.org> | 2004-05-05 07:05:32 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric Andersen <andersen@codepoet.org> | 2004-05-05 07:05:32 +0000 |
| commit | 6c8161d69fe9fce0f862b678aaa84866aaaeff8f (patch) | |
| tree | 28ca3d47c5325c070ffc3e84b136d8bed02a328f | |
| parent | 5ec58285c3990ebab9900295f1a1d32824338719 (diff) | |
| download | busybox-6c8161d69fe9fce0f862b678aaa84866aaaeff8f.tar.gz | |
Steve Grubb writes:
Hello,
Last November a bug was found in iproute. CAN-2003-0856 has more information.
Basically, netlink packets can come from any user. If a program performs action
based on netlink packets, they must be examined to make sure they came from the
place they are expected (the kernel).
Attached is a patch against pre8. Please apply this before releasing 1.00 final.
All users of busy box may be vulnerable to local attacks without it.
Best Regards,
Steve Grubb
| -rw-r--r-- | networking/libiproute/libnetlink.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/networking/libiproute/libnetlink.c b/networking/libiproute/libnetlink.c index 861daef86..5545be8fe 100644 --- a/networking/libiproute/libnetlink.c +++ b/networking/libiproute/libnetlink.c @@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ int rtnl_dump_filter(struct rtnl_handle *rth, while (NLMSG_OK(h, status)) { int err; - if (h->nlmsg_pid != rth->local.nl_pid || + if (nladdr.nl_pid != 0 || + h->nlmsg_pid != rth->local.nl_pid || h->nlmsg_seq != rth->dump) { if (junk) { err = junk(&nladdr, h, arg2); @@ -270,7 +271,8 @@ int rtnl_talk(struct rtnl_handle *rtnl, struct nlmsghdr *n, pid_t peer, bb_error_msg_and_die("!!!malformed message: len=%d", len); } - if (h->nlmsg_pid != rtnl->local.nl_pid || + if (nladdr.nl_pid != peer || + h->nlmsg_pid != rtnl->local.nl_pid || h->nlmsg_seq != seq) { if (junk) { l_err = junk(&nladdr, h, jarg); |