Port over the last of the tinylogin applets

 -Erik

1 files changed, 246 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/libbb/obscure.c b/libbb/obscure.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc7de751d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libbb/obscure.c
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+/* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */
+/*
+ * Copyright 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh <jockgrrl@austin.rr.com>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of Julianne F. Haugh nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY JULIE HAUGH AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL JULIE HAUGH OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This version of obscure.c contains modifications to support "cracklib"
+ * by Alec Muffet (alec.muffett@uk.sun.com).  You must obtain the Cracklib
+ * library source code for this function to operate.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "libbb.h"
+
+/*
+ * can't be a palindrome - like `R A D A R' or `M A D A M'
+ */
+
+static int palindrome(const char *old, const char *newval)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	i = strlen(newval);
+
+	for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+		if (newval[i - j - 1] != newval[j])
+			return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * more than half of the characters are different ones.
+ */
+
+static int similiar(const char *old, const char *newval)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = j = 0; newval[i] && old[i]; i++)
+		if (strchr(newval, old[i]))
+			j++;
+
+	if (i >= j * 2)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * a nice mix of characters.
+ */
+
+static int simple(const char *old, const char *newval)
+{
+	int digits = 0;
+	int uppers = 0;
+	int lowers = 0;
+	int others = 0;
+	int size;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; newval[i]; i++) {
+		if (isdigit(newval[i]))
+			digits++;
+		else if (isupper(newval[i]))
+			uppers++;
+		else if (islower(newval[i]))
+			lowers++;
+		else
+			others++;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The scam is this - a password of only one character type
+	 * must be 8 letters long.  Two types, 7, and so on.
+	 */
+
+	size = 9;
+	if (digits)
+		size--;
+	if (uppers)
+		size--;
+	if (lowers)
+		size--;
+	if (others)
+		size--;
+
+	if (size <= i)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static char *str_lower(char *string)
+{
+	char *cp;
+
+	for (cp = string; *cp; cp++)
+		*cp = tolower(*cp);
+	return string;
+}
+
+static char *password_check(const char *old, const char *newval, const struct passwd *pwdp)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	char *oldmono, *newmono, *wrapped;
+
+	if (strcmp(newval, old) == 0)
+		return "no change";
+
+	newmono = str_lower(xstrdup(newval));
+	oldmono = str_lower(xstrdup(old));
+	wrapped = (char *) xmalloc(strlen(oldmono) * 2 + 1);
+	strcpy(wrapped, oldmono);
+	strcat(wrapped, oldmono);
+
+	if (palindrome(oldmono, newmono))
+		msg = "a palindrome";
+
+	if (!msg && strcmp(oldmono, newmono) == 0)
+		msg = "case changes only";
+
+	if (!msg && similiar(oldmono, newmono))
+		msg = "too similiar";
+
+	if (!msg && simple(old, newval))
+		msg = "too simple";
+
+	if (!msg && strstr(wrapped, newmono))
+		msg = "rotated";
+
+	bzero(newmono, strlen(newmono));
+	bzero(oldmono, strlen(oldmono));
+	bzero(wrapped, strlen(wrapped));
+	free(newmono);
+	free(oldmono);
+	free(wrapped);
+
+	return msg;
+}
+
+static char *obscure_msg(const char *old, const char *newval, const struct passwd *pwdp)
+{
+	int maxlen, oldlen, newlen;
+	char *new1, *old1, *msg;
+
+	oldlen = strlen(old);
+	newlen = strlen(newval);
+
+#if 0							/* why not check the password when set for the first time?  --marekm */
+	if (old[0] == '\0')
+		/* return (1); */
+		return NULL;
+#endif
+
+	if (newlen < 5)
+		return "too short";
+
+	/*
+	 * Remaining checks are optional.
+	 */
+	/* Not for us -- Sean
+	 *if (!getdef_bool("OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB"))
+	 *      return NULL;
+	 */
+	msg = password_check(old, newval, pwdp);
+	if (msg)
+		return msg;
+
+	/* The traditional crypt() truncates passwords to 8 chars.  It is
+	   possible to circumvent the above checks by choosing an easy
+	   8-char password and adding some random characters to it...
+	   Example: "password$%^&*123".  So check it again, this time
+	   truncated to the maximum length.  Idea from npasswd.  --marekm */
+
+	maxlen = 8;
+	if (oldlen <= maxlen && newlen <= maxlen)
+		return NULL;
+
+	new1 = (char *) xstrdup(newval);
+	old1 = (char *) xstrdup(old);
+	if (newlen > maxlen)
+		new1[maxlen] = '\0';
+	if (oldlen > maxlen)
+		old1[maxlen] = '\0';
+
+	msg = password_check(old1, new1, pwdp);
+
+	bzero(new1, newlen);
+	bzero(old1, oldlen);
+	free(new1);
+	free(old1);
+
+	return msg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obscure - see if password is obscure enough.
+ *
+ *	The programmer is encouraged to add as much complexity to this
+ *	routine as desired.  Included are some of my favorite ways to
+ *	check passwords.
+ */
+
+extern int obscure(const char *old, const char *newval, const struct passwd *pwdp)
+{
+	char *msg = obscure_msg(old, newval, pwdp);
+
+	/*  if (msg) { */
+	if (msg != NULL) {
+		printf("Bad password: %s.\n", msg);
+		/* return 0; */
+		return 1;
+	}
+	/* return 1; */
+	return 0;
+}