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authorMorten Kvistgaard <MK@pch-engineering.dk>2014-08-05 21:57:18 +0200
committerDenys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>2014-08-05 21:57:18 +0200
commitfeac9b607dc68ea63992a46b3b8361f00f663cdc (patch)
treeed5bca82370298e195f5b5e3d84d40f9e7470a32 /libbb
parent09a0e2223f68a266749043bf33c84faeb5cee8a0 (diff)
downloadbusybox-feac9b607dc68ea63992a46b3b8361f00f663cdc.tar.gz
ftpd: add optional support for authentication
function old new delta cmdio_get_cmd_and_arg - 237 +237 get_passwd - 97 +97 check_password - 82 +82 ftpd_main 2297 2178 -119 ask_and_check_password_extended 206 84 -122 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (add/remove: 3/0 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 416/-241) Total: 175 bytes Signed-off-by: Morten Kvistgaard <MK@pch-engineering.dk> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'libbb')
-rw-r--r--libbb/Kbuild.src1
-rw-r--r--libbb/correct_password.c96
2 files changed, 68 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/libbb/Kbuild.src b/libbb/Kbuild.src
index 62680bd52..0a9e803d7 100644
--- a/libbb/Kbuild.src
+++ b/libbb/Kbuild.src
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_VLOCK) += pw_encrypt.o correct_password.o
lib-$(CONFIG_SU) += pw_encrypt.o correct_password.o
lib-$(CONFIG_LOGIN) += pw_encrypt.o correct_password.o
lib-$(CONFIG_FEATURE_HTTPD_AUTH_MD5) += pw_encrypt.o
+lib-$(CONFIG_FEATURE_FTP_AUTHENTICATION) += pw_encrypt.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DF) += find_mount_point.o
lib-$(CONFIG_MKFS_MINIX) += find_mount_point.o
diff --git a/libbb/correct_password.c b/libbb/correct_password.c
index acadf3914..513c93028 100644
--- a/libbb/correct_password.c
+++ b/libbb/correct_password.c
@@ -30,6 +30,63 @@
#include "libbb.h"
+#define SHADOW_BUFSIZE 256
+
+/* Retrieve encrypted password string for pw.
+ * If pw == NULL, return a string which fails password check against any
+ * password.
+ */
+#if !ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
+#define get_passwd(pw, buffer) get_passwd(pw)
+#endif
+static const char *get_passwd(const struct passwd *pw, char buffer[SHADOW_BUFSIZE])
+{
+ const char *pass;
+
+ if (!pw)
+ return "aa"; /* "aa" will never match */
+
+ pass = pw->pw_passwd;
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
+ /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
+ if ((pass[0] == 'x' || pass[0] == '*') && !pass[1]) {
+ struct spwd spw;
+ int r;
+ /* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
+ * At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
+ struct spwd *result = NULL;
+ r = getspnam_r(pw->pw_name, &spw, buffer, SHADOW_BUFSIZE, &result);
+ pass = (r || !result) ? "aa" : result->sp_pwdp;
+ }
+#endif
+ return pass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if PW has an empty password.
+ * Return 1 if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
+ * 0 if not.
+ * NULL pw means "just fake it for login with bad username"
+ */
+int FAST_FUNC check_password(const struct passwd *pw, const char *plaintext)
+{
+ IF_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS(char buffer[SHADOW_BUFSIZE];)
+ char *encrypted;
+ const char *pw_pass;
+ int r;
+
+ pw_pass = get_passwd(pw, buffer);
+ if (!pw_pass[0]) { /* empty password field? */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ encrypted = pw_encrypt(plaintext, /*salt:*/ pw_pass, 1);
+ r = (strcmp(encrypted, pw_pass) == 0);
+ free(encrypted);
+ return r;
+}
+
+
/* Ask the user for a password.
* Return 1 without asking if PW has an empty password.
* Return -1 on EOF, error while reading input, or timeout.
@@ -41,42 +98,23 @@
int FAST_FUNC ask_and_check_password_extended(const struct passwd *pw,
int timeout, const char *prompt)
{
- char *unencrypted, *encrypted;
- const char *correct;
+ IF_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS(char buffer[SHADOW_BUFSIZE];)
+ char *plaintext;
+ const char *pw_pass;
int r;
- /* fake salt. crypt() can choke otherwise. */
- correct = "aa";
- if (!pw) {
- /* "aa" will never match */
- goto fake_it;
- }
- correct = pw->pw_passwd;
-#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
- /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
- if ((correct[0] == 'x' || correct[0] == '*') && !correct[1]) {
- struct spwd spw;
- char buffer[256];
- /* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
- * At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
- struct spwd *result = NULL;
- r = getspnam_r(pw->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result);
- correct = (r || !result) ? "aa" : result->sp_pwdp;
- }
-#endif
- if (!correct[0]) /* empty password field? */
+ pw_pass = get_passwd(pw, buffer);
+ if (!pw_pass[0]) /* empty password field? */
return 1;
- fake_it:
- unencrypted = bb_ask(STDIN_FILENO, timeout, prompt);
- if (!unencrypted) {
+ plaintext = bb_ask(STDIN_FILENO, timeout, prompt);
+ if (!plaintext) {
/* EOF (such as ^D) or error (such as ^C) or timeout */
return -1;
}
- encrypted = pw_encrypt(unencrypted, correct, 1);
- r = (strcmp(encrypted, correct) == 0);
- free(encrypted);
- nuke_str(unencrypted);
+
+ r = check_password(pw, plaintext);
+ nuke_str(plaintext);
return r;
}