diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | networking/httpd.c | 48 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/networking/httpd.c b/networking/httpd.c index fb363c56f..6f4ca05a7 100644 --- a/networking/httpd.c +++ b/networking/httpd.c @@ -950,7 +950,6 @@ static int getLine(void) * (int bodyLen) . . . . . . . . Length of the post body. * (const char *cookie) . . . . . For set HTTP_COOKIE. * (const char *content_type) . . For set CONTENT_TYPE. - * * $Return: (char *) . . . . A pointer to the decoded string (same as input). * @@ -984,31 +983,32 @@ static int sendCgi(const char *url, if (!pid) { /* child process */ char *script; - char *purl = xstrdup(url); + char *purl; char realpath_buff[MAXPATHLEN]; - if (purl == NULL) - _exit(242); - - inFd = toCgi[0]; - outFd = fromCgi[1]; + if (config->accepted_socket > 1) + close(config->accepted_socket); + if (config->server_socket > 1) + close(config->server_socket); - dup2(inFd, 0); // replace stdin with the pipe - dup2(outFd, 1); // replace stdout with the pipe + dup2(toCgi[0], 0); // replace stdin with the pipe + dup2(fromCgi[1], 1); // replace stdout with the pipe + /* Huh? User seeing stderr can be a security problem... + * and if cgi really wants that, it can always dup2(1,2)... if (!DEBUG) - dup2(outFd, 2); // replace stderr with the pipe - + dup2(fromCgi[1], 2); // replace stderr with the pipe + */ + /* I think we cannot inadvertently close 0, 1 here... */ close(toCgi[0]); close(toCgi[1]); close(fromCgi[0]); close(fromCgi[1]); - close(config->accepted_socket); - close(config->server_socket); - /* * Find PATH_INFO. */ + xfunc_error_retval = 242; + purl = xstrdup(url); script = purl; while ((script = strchr(script + 1, '/')) != NULL) { /* have script.cgi/PATH_INFO or dirs/script.cgi[/PATH_INFO] */ @@ -1210,33 +1210,33 @@ static int sendCgi(const char *url, #if PIPESIZE >= MAX_MEMORY_BUFF # error "PIPESIZE >= MAX_MEMORY_BUFF" #endif - /* NB: was safe_read. If it *has to be* safe_read, */ - /* please explain why in this comment... */ - count = full_read(inFd, rbuf, PIPESIZE); + /* Must use safe_read, not full_read, because + * cgi may output a few first lines and then wait + * for POSTDATA without closing stdout. + * With full_read we may wait here forever. */ + count = safe_read(inFd, rbuf, PIPESIZE); if (count == 0) break; /* closed */ if (count < 0) continue; /* huh, error, why continue?? */ if (firstLine) { - /* full_read (above) avoids - * "chopped up into small chunks" syndrome here */ + static const char HTTP_200[] = "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n\r\n"; rbuf[count] = '\0'; /* check to see if the user script added headers */ -#define HTTP_200 "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n\r\n" + /* (NB: buggy wrt cgi splitting "HTTP OK") */ if (memcmp(rbuf, HTTP_200, 4) != 0) { /* there is no "HTTP", do it ourself */ full_write(s, HTTP_200, sizeof(HTTP_200)-1); } -#undef HTTP_200 /* Example of valid GCI without "Content-type:" * echo -en "HTTP/1.0 302 Found\r\n" * echo -en "Location: http://www.busybox.net\r\n" * echo -en "\r\n" + if (!strstr(rbuf, "ontent-")) { + full_write(s, "Content-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n", 28); + } */ - //if (!strstr(rbuf, "ontent-")) { - // full_write(s, "Content-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n", 28); - //} firstLine = 0; } if (full_write(s, rbuf, count) != count) |