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-rw-r--r--networking/httpd.c48
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/networking/httpd.c b/networking/httpd.c
index fb363c56f..6f4ca05a7 100644
--- a/networking/httpd.c
+++ b/networking/httpd.c
@@ -950,7 +950,6 @@ static int getLine(void)
* (int bodyLen) . . . . . . . . Length of the post body.
* (const char *cookie) . . . . . For set HTTP_COOKIE.
* (const char *content_type) . . For set CONTENT_TYPE.
-
*
* $Return: (char *) . . . . A pointer to the decoded string (same as input).
*
@@ -984,31 +983,32 @@ static int sendCgi(const char *url,
if (!pid) {
/* child process */
char *script;
- char *purl = xstrdup(url);
+ char *purl;
char realpath_buff[MAXPATHLEN];
- if (purl == NULL)
- _exit(242);
-
- inFd = toCgi[0];
- outFd = fromCgi[1];
+ if (config->accepted_socket > 1)
+ close(config->accepted_socket);
+ if (config->server_socket > 1)
+ close(config->server_socket);
- dup2(inFd, 0); // replace stdin with the pipe
- dup2(outFd, 1); // replace stdout with the pipe
+ dup2(toCgi[0], 0); // replace stdin with the pipe
+ dup2(fromCgi[1], 1); // replace stdout with the pipe
+ /* Huh? User seeing stderr can be a security problem...
+ * and if cgi really wants that, it can always dup2(1,2)...
if (!DEBUG)
- dup2(outFd, 2); // replace stderr with the pipe
-
+ dup2(fromCgi[1], 2); // replace stderr with the pipe
+ */
+ /* I think we cannot inadvertently close 0, 1 here... */
close(toCgi[0]);
close(toCgi[1]);
close(fromCgi[0]);
close(fromCgi[1]);
- close(config->accepted_socket);
- close(config->server_socket);
-
/*
* Find PATH_INFO.
*/
+ xfunc_error_retval = 242;
+ purl = xstrdup(url);
script = purl;
while ((script = strchr(script + 1, '/')) != NULL) {
/* have script.cgi/PATH_INFO or dirs/script.cgi[/PATH_INFO] */
@@ -1210,33 +1210,33 @@ static int sendCgi(const char *url,
#if PIPESIZE >= MAX_MEMORY_BUFF
# error "PIPESIZE >= MAX_MEMORY_BUFF"
#endif
- /* NB: was safe_read. If it *has to be* safe_read, */
- /* please explain why in this comment... */
- count = full_read(inFd, rbuf, PIPESIZE);
+ /* Must use safe_read, not full_read, because
+ * cgi may output a few first lines and then wait
+ * for POSTDATA without closing stdout.
+ * With full_read we may wait here forever. */
+ count = safe_read(inFd, rbuf, PIPESIZE);
if (count == 0)
break; /* closed */
if (count < 0)
continue; /* huh, error, why continue?? */
if (firstLine) {
- /* full_read (above) avoids
- * "chopped up into small chunks" syndrome here */
+ static const char HTTP_200[] = "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n\r\n";
rbuf[count] = '\0';
/* check to see if the user script added headers */
-#define HTTP_200 "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n\r\n"
+ /* (NB: buggy wrt cgi splitting "HTTP OK") */
if (memcmp(rbuf, HTTP_200, 4) != 0) {
/* there is no "HTTP", do it ourself */
full_write(s, HTTP_200, sizeof(HTTP_200)-1);
}
-#undef HTTP_200
/* Example of valid GCI without "Content-type:"
* echo -en "HTTP/1.0 302 Found\r\n"
* echo -en "Location: http://www.busybox.net\r\n"
* echo -en "\r\n"
+ if (!strstr(rbuf, "ontent-")) {
+ full_write(s, "Content-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n", 28);
+ }
*/
- //if (!strstr(rbuf, "ontent-")) {
- // full_write(s, "Content-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n", 28);
- //}
firstLine = 0;
}
if (full_write(s, rbuf, count) != count)