diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'networking/tls.c')
-rw-r--r-- | networking/tls.c | 360 |
1 files changed, 278 insertions, 82 deletions
diff --git a/networking/tls.c b/networking/tls.c index fba66f6f0..38a965ad6 100644 --- a/networking/tls.c +++ b/networking/tls.c @@ -13,16 +13,17 @@ //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_mul_comba.o //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_sqr_comba.o //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_aes.o +//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_aesgcm.o //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_rsa.o //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_fe.o -////kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_aes_gcm.o #include "tls.h" -//Tested against kernel.org: //TLS 1.2 #define TLS_MAJ 3 #define TLS_MIN 3 + +//Tested against kernel.org: //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE *** matrixssl uses this on my box //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE @@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE *** select this? +//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE // works against "openssl s_server -cipher NULL" // and against wolfssl-3.9.10-stable/examples/server/server.c: @@ -60,6 +61,11 @@ // bug #11456: host is.gd accepts only ECDHE-ECDSA-foo (the simplest which works: ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA 0xC009) #define CIPHER_ID3 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +// ftp.openbsd.org only supports ECDHE-RSA-AESnnn-GCM-SHAnnn or ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 +#define CIPHER_ID4 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + +#define NUM_CIPHERS 4 + #define TLS_DEBUG 0 #define TLS_DEBUG_HASH 0 @@ -207,7 +213,6 @@ enum { SHA1_OUTSIZE = 20, SHA256_OUTSIZE = 32, - AES_BLOCKSIZE = 16, AES128_KEYSIZE = 16, AES256_KEYSIZE = 32, @@ -216,7 +221,7 @@ enum { RECHDR_LEN = 5, /* 8 = 3+5. 3 extra bytes result in record data being 32-bit aligned */ - OUTBUF_PFX = 8 + AES_BLOCKSIZE, /* header + IV */ + OUTBUF_PFX = 8 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* header + IV */ OUTBUF_SFX = TLS_MAX_MAC_SIZE + TLS_MAX_CRYPTBLOCK_SIZE, /* MAC + padding */ // RFC 5246 @@ -263,8 +268,11 @@ struct record_hdr { }; enum { - KEY_ALG_RSA, - KEY_ALG_ECDSA, + NEED_EC_KEY = 1 << 0, + GOT_CERT_RSA_KEY_ALG = 1 << 1, + GOT_CERT_ECDSA_KEY_ALG = 1 << 2, + GOT_EC_KEY = 1 << 3, + ENCRYPTION_AESGCM = 1 << 4, }; struct tls_handshake_data { /* In bbox, md5/sha1/sha256 ctx's are the same structure */ @@ -273,14 +281,14 @@ struct tls_handshake_data { uint8_t client_and_server_rand32[2 * 32]; uint8_t master_secret[48]; - smallint key_alg; //TODO: store just the DER key here, parse/use/delete it when sending client key //this way it will stay key type agnostic here. psRsaKey_t server_rsa_pub_key; uint8_t ecc_pub_key32[32]; - unsigned saved_client_hello_size; - uint8_t saved_client_hello[1]; +/* HANDSHAKE HASH: */ + //unsigned saved_client_hello_size; + //uint8_t saved_client_hello[1]; }; @@ -609,7 +617,7 @@ static void *tls_get_zeroed_outbuf(tls_state_t *tls, int len) return record; } -static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type) +static void xwrite_encrypted_and_hmac_signed(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type) { uint8_t *buf = tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX; struct record_hdr *xhdr; @@ -619,7 +627,7 @@ static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type) if (CIPHER_ID1 != TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 /* if "no encryption" can't be selected */ || tls->cipher_id != TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 /* or if it wasn't selected */ ) { - xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN - AES_BLOCKSIZE); /* place for IV */ + xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN - AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* place for IV */ } xhdr->type = type; @@ -722,7 +730,7 @@ static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type) // AES_128_CBC Block 16 16 16 // AES_256_CBC Block 32 16 16 - tls_get_random(buf - AES_BLOCKSIZE, AES_BLOCKSIZE); /* IV */ + tls_get_random(buf - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* IV */ dbg("before crypt: 5 hdr + %u data + %u hash bytes\n", size - tls->MAC_size, tls->MAC_size); @@ -742,23 +750,24 @@ static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type) // If you need no bytes to reach BLOCKSIZE, you have to pad a full // BLOCKSIZE with bytes of value (BLOCKSIZE-1). // It's ok to have more than minimum padding, but we do minimum. - padding_length = (~size) & (AES_BLOCKSIZE - 1); + padding_length = (~size) & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); do { buf[size++] = padding_length; /* padding */ - } while ((size & (AES_BLOCKSIZE - 1)) != 0); + } while ((size & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)) != 0); /* Encrypt content+MAC+padding in place */ +//optimize key setup aes_cbc_encrypt( tls->client_write_key, tls->key_size, /* selects 128/256 */ - buf - AES_BLOCKSIZE, /* IV */ + buf - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* IV */ buf, size, /* plaintext */ buf /* ciphertext */ ); /* Write out */ dbg("writing 5 + %u IV + %u encrypted bytes, padding_length:0x%02x\n", - AES_BLOCKSIZE, size, padding_length); - size += AES_BLOCKSIZE; /* + IV */ + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, size, padding_length); + size += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* + IV */ xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8; xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff; dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size); @@ -766,23 +775,109 @@ static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type) dbg("wrote %u bytes\n", (int)RECHDR_LEN + size); } +/* Example how GCM encryption combines nonce, aad, input and generates + * "header | exp_nonce | encrypted output | tag": + * nonce:0d 6a 26 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 (implicit 4 bytes (derived from master secret), then explicit 8 bytes) + * aad: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 17 03 03 00 1c + * in: 47 45 54 20 2f 69 6e 64 65 78 2e 68 74 6d 6c 20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 30 0d 0a 0d 0a "GET /index.html HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n" (0x1c bytes) + * out: f7 8a b2 8f 78 0e f6 d5 76 17 2e b5 6d 46 59 56 8b 46 9f 0b d9 2c 35 28 13 66 19 be + * tag: c2 86 ce 4a 50 4a d0 aa 50 b3 76 5c 49 2a 3f 33 + * sent: 17 03 03 00 34|00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01|f7 8a b2 8f 78 0e f6 d5 76 17 2e b5 6d 46 59 56 8b 46 9f 0b d9 2c 35 28 13 66 19 be|c2 86 ce 4a 50 4a d0 aa 50 b3 76 5c 49 2a 3f 33 + * .............................................^^ buf points here + */ +static void xwrite_encrypted_aesgcm(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type) +{ +//go for [16] + uint8_t aad[13]; + uint8_t nonce[12 + 4]; /* +4 creates space for AES block counter */ + uint8_t scratch[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; //[16] + uint8_t authtag[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; //[16] + uint8_t *buf; + struct record_hdr *xhdr; + unsigned remaining; + unsigned cnt; + + buf = tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX; /* see above for the byte it points to */ + dump_hex("xwrite_encrypted_aesgcm plaintext:%s\n", buf, size); + + xhdr = (void*)(buf - 8 - RECHDR_LEN); + xhdr->type = type; /* do it here so that "type" param no longer used */ + + aad[8] = type; + aad[9] = TLS_MAJ; + aad[10] = TLS_MIN; + aad[11] = size >> 8; + aad[12] = size & 0xff; + + memcpy(nonce, tls->client_write_IV, 4); + memcpy(nonce + 4, &tls->write_seq64_be, 8); + memcpy(aad, &tls->write_seq64_be, 8); + memcpy(buf - 8, &tls->write_seq64_be, 8); +//optimize + /* seq64 is not used later in this func, can increment here */ + tls->write_seq64_be = SWAP_BE64(1 + SWAP_BE64(tls->write_seq64_be)); + +#define COUNTER(v) (*(uint32_t*)(v + 12)) + + cnt = 1; + remaining = size; + while (remaining != 0) { + unsigned n; + + cnt++; + COUNTER(nonce) = htonl(cnt); /* yes, first cnt here is 2 (!) */ + aes_encrypt_one_block(&tls->aes_encrypt, nonce, scratch); + n = remaining > AES_BLOCK_SIZE ? AES_BLOCK_SIZE : remaining; + xorbuf(buf, scratch, n); + buf += n; + remaining -= n; + } + +//optimize fixed sizes + aesgcm_GHASH(tls->H, aad, sizeof(aad), tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX, size, authtag, sizeof(authtag)); + COUNTER(nonce) = htonl(1); + aes_encrypt_one_block(&tls->aes_encrypt, nonce, scratch); + xorbuf(authtag, scratch, sizeof(authtag)); + + memcpy(buf, authtag, sizeof(authtag)); +#undef COUNTER + + /* Write out */ + xhdr = (void*)(tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX - 8 - RECHDR_LEN); + size += 8 + sizeof(authtag); + /*xhdr->type = type; - already is */ + xhdr->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ; + xhdr->proto_min = TLS_MIN; + xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8; + xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff; + size += RECHDR_LEN; + dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, size); + xwrite(tls->ofd, xhdr, size); + dbg("wrote %u bytes\n", size); +} + +static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type) +{ + if (!(tls->flags & ENCRYPTION_AESGCM)) { + xwrite_encrypted_and_hmac_signed(tls, size, type); + return; + } + xwrite_encrypted_aesgcm(tls, size, type); +} + static void xwrite_handshake_record(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size) { - //if (!tls->encrypt_on_write) { - uint8_t *buf = tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX; - struct record_hdr *xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN); + uint8_t *buf = tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX; + struct record_hdr *xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN); - xhdr->type = RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE; - xhdr->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ; - xhdr->proto_min = TLS_MIN; - xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8; - xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff; - dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size); - xwrite(tls->ofd, xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size); - dbg("wrote %u bytes\n", (int)RECHDR_LEN + size); - // return; - //} - //xwrite_encrypted(tls, size, RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE); + xhdr->type = RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE; + xhdr->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ; + xhdr->proto_min = TLS_MIN; + xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8; + xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff; + dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size); + xwrite(tls->ofd, xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size); + dbg("wrote %u bytes\n", (int)RECHDR_LEN + size); } static void xwrite_and_update_handshake_hash(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size) @@ -826,6 +921,52 @@ static const char *alert_text(int code) return itoa(code); } +static void tls_aesgcm_decrypt(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *buf, int size) +{ +//go for [16] + //uint8_t aad[13]; + uint8_t nonce[12 + 4]; /* +4 creates space for AES block counter */ + uint8_t scratch[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; //[16] + //uint8_t authtag[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; //[16] + unsigned remaining; + unsigned cnt; + + //aad[8] = type; + //aad[9] = TLS_MAJ; + //aad[10] = TLS_MIN; + //aad[11] = size >> 8; + //aad[12] = size & 0xff; + + memcpy(nonce, tls->server_write_IV, 4); + memcpy(nonce + 4, buf, 8); + buf += 8; + +#define COUNTER(v) (*(uint32_t*)(v + 12)) + + cnt = 1; + remaining = size; + while (remaining != 0) { + unsigned n; + + cnt++; + COUNTER(nonce) = htonl(cnt); /* yes, first cnt here is 2 (!) */ + aes_encrypt_one_block(&tls->aes_decrypt, nonce, scratch); + n = remaining > AES_BLOCK_SIZE ? AES_BLOCK_SIZE : remaining; + xorbuf(buf, scratch, n); + buf += n; + remaining -= n; + } + +////optimize fixed sizes + //aesgcm_GHASH(tls->H, aad, sizeof(aad), tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX, size, authtag, sizeof(authtag)); + //COUNTER(nonce) = htonl(1); + //aes_encrypt_one_block(&tls->aes_encrypt, nonce, scratch); + //xorbuf(authtag, scratch, sizeof(authtag)); + + //memcmp(buf, authtag, sizeof(authtag)) || DIE("HASH DOES NOT MATCH!"); +#undef COUNTER +} + static int tls_xread_record(tls_state_t *tls, const char *expected) { struct record_hdr *xhdr; @@ -896,34 +1037,44 @@ static int tls_xread_record(tls_state_t *tls, const char *expected) sz = target - RECHDR_LEN; /* Needs to be decrypted? */ - if (tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read > tls->MAC_size) { - uint8_t *p = tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN; - int padding_len; - - if (sz & (AES_BLOCKSIZE-1) - || sz < (int)tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read - ) { - bb_error_msg_and_die("bad encrypted len:%u < %u", - sz, tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read); + if (tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read != 0) { + if (sz < (int)tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read) + bb_error_msg_and_die("bad encrypted len:%u", sz); + + if (tls->flags & ENCRYPTION_AESGCM) { + /* AESGCM */ + uint8_t *p = tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN; + + sz -= 8 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* we will overwrite nonce, drop hash */ + tls_aesgcm_decrypt(tls, p, sz); + memmove(p, p + 8, sz); + dbg("encrypted size:%u\n", sz); + } else + if (tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read > tls->MAC_size) { + /* AES+SHA */ + uint8_t *p = tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN; + int padding_len; + + if (sz & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1)) + bb_error_msg_and_die("bad encrypted len:%u", sz); + + /* Decrypt content+MAC+padding, moving it over IV in the process */ + sz -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* we will overwrite IV now */ + aes_cbc_decrypt( + tls->server_write_key, tls->key_size, /* selects 128/256 */ + p, /* IV */ + p + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, sz, /* ciphertext */ + p /* plaintext */ + ); + padding_len = p[sz - 1]; + dbg("encrypted size:%u type:0x%02x padding_length:0x%02x\n", sz, p[0], padding_len); + padding_len++; + sz -= tls->MAC_size + padding_len; /* drop MAC and padding */ + } else { + /* if nonzero, then it's TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: drop MAC */ + /* else: no encryption yet on input, subtract zero = NOP */ + sz -= tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read; } - /* Decrypt content+MAC+padding, moving it over IV in the process */ - sz -= AES_BLOCKSIZE; /* we will overwrite IV now */ - aes_cbc_decrypt( - tls->server_write_key, tls->key_size, /* selects 128/256 */ - p, /* IV */ - p + AES_BLOCKSIZE, sz, /* ciphertext */ - p /* plaintext */ - ); - padding_len = p[sz - 1]; - dbg("encrypted size:%u type:0x%02x padding_length:0x%02x\n", sz, p[0], padding_len); - padding_len++; - sz -= tls->MAC_size + padding_len; /* drop MAC and padding */ - //if (sz < 0) - // bb_error_msg_and_die("bad padding size:%u", padding_len); - } else { - /* if nonzero, then it's TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: drop MAC */ - /* else: no encryption yet on input, subtract zero = NOP */ - sz -= tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read; } if (sz < 0) bb_error_msg_and_die("encrypted data too short"); @@ -964,7 +1115,8 @@ static int tls_xread_record(tls_state_t *tls, const char *expected) * in our FINISHED record must include data of incoming packets too! */ if (tls->inbuf[0] == RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE - && tls->MAC_size != 0 /* do we know which hash to use? (server_hello() does not!) */ +/* HANDSHAKE HASH: */ + // && do_we_know_which_hash_to_use /* server_hello() might not know it in the future! */ ) { hash_handshake(tls, "<< hash:%s", tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN, sz); } @@ -1198,16 +1350,16 @@ static void find_key_in_der_cert(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *der, int len) }; if (memcmp(der, OID_RSA_KEY_ALG, sizeof(OID_RSA_KEY_ALG)) == 0) { dbg("RSA key\n"); - tls->hsd->key_alg = KEY_ALG_RSA; + tls->flags |= GOT_CERT_RSA_KEY_ALG; } else if (memcmp(der, OID_ECDSA_KEY_ALG, sizeof(OID_ECDSA_KEY_ALG)) == 0) { dbg("ECDSA key\n"); - tls->hsd->key_alg = KEY_ALG_ECDSA; + tls->flags |= GOT_CERT_ECDSA_KEY_ALG; } else - bb_error_msg_and_die("not RSA or ECDSA key"); + bb_error_msg_and_die("not RSA or ECDSA cert"); } - if (tls->hsd->key_alg == KEY_ALG_RSA) { + if (tls->flags & GOT_CERT_RSA_KEY_ALG) { /* parse RSA key: */ //based on getAsnRsaPubKey(), pkcs1ParsePrivBin() is also of note /* skip subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm */ @@ -1301,7 +1453,7 @@ static void send_client_hello_and_alloc_hsd(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni) uint8_t session_id_len; /* uint8_t session_id[]; */ uint8_t cipherid_len16_hi, cipherid_len16_lo; - uint8_t cipherid[2 * (2 + !!CIPHER_ID2 + !!CIPHER_ID3)]; /* actually variable */ + uint8_t cipherid[2 * (1 + NUM_CIPHERS)]; /* actually variable */ uint8_t comprtypes_len; uint8_t comprtypes[1]; /* actually variable */ /* Extensions (SNI shown): @@ -1364,6 +1516,10 @@ static void send_client_hello_and_alloc_hsd(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni) if ((CIPHER_ID3 >> 8) != 0) record->cipherid[6] = CIPHER_ID3 >> 8; /*************************/ record->cipherid[7] = CIPHER_ID3 & 0xff; #endif +#if CIPHER_ID4 + if ((CIPHER_ID4 >> 8) != 0) record->cipherid[6] = CIPHER_ID4 >> 8; + /*************************/ record->cipherid[7] = CIPHER_ID4 & 0xff; +#endif record->comprtypes_len = 1; /* record->comprtypes[0] = 0; */ @@ -1385,15 +1541,23 @@ static void send_client_hello_and_alloc_hsd(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni) } memcpy(ptr, supported_groups, sizeof(supported_groups)); - dbg(">> CLIENT_HELLO\n"); - /* Can hash it only when we know which MAC hash to use */ - /*xwrite_and_update_handshake_hash(tls, len); - WRONG! */ - xwrite_handshake_record(tls, len); - - tls->hsd = xzalloc(sizeof(*tls->hsd) + len); + tls->hsd = xzalloc(sizeof(*tls->hsd)); + /* HANDSHAKE HASH: ^^^ + len if need to save saved_client_hello */ + memcpy(tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32, record->rand32, sizeof(record->rand32)); +/* HANDSHAKE HASH: tls->hsd->saved_client_hello_size = len; memcpy(tls->hsd->saved_client_hello, record, len); - memcpy(tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32, record->rand32, sizeof(record->rand32)); + */ + dbg(">> CLIENT_HELLO\n"); + /* Can hash immediately only if we know which MAC hash to use. + * So far we do know: it's sha256: + */ + sha256_begin(&tls->hsd->handshake_hash_ctx); + xwrite_and_update_handshake_hash(tls, len); + /* if this would become infeasible: save tls->hsd->saved_client_hello, + * use "xwrite_handshake_record(tls, len)" here, + * and hash saved_client_hello later. + */ } static void get_server_hello(tls_state_t *tls) @@ -1463,18 +1627,28 @@ static void get_server_hello(tls_state_t *tls) if (cipher == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA || cipher == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ) { + if (cipher == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) + tls->flags |= NEED_EC_KEY; tls->key_size = AES128_KEYSIZE; tls->MAC_size = SHA1_OUTSIZE; } - else { /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */ + else + if (cipher == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) { tls->key_size = AES256_KEYSIZE; tls->MAC_size = SHA256_OUTSIZE; } + else { /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ + tls->flags |= NEED_EC_KEY | ENCRYPTION_AESGCM; + tls->key_size = AES128_KEYSIZE; + /* tls->MAC_size = 0; */ + tls->IV_size = 4; + } /* Handshake hash eventually destined to FINISHED record * is sha256 regardless of cipher * (at least for all ciphers defined by RFC5246). * It's not sha1 for AES_128_CBC_SHA - only MAC is sha1, not this hash. */ +/* HANDSHAKE HASH: sha256_begin(&tls->hsd->handshake_hash_ctx); hash_handshake(tls, ">> client hello hash:%s", tls->hsd->saved_client_hello, tls->hsd->saved_client_hello_size @@ -1482,6 +1656,7 @@ static void get_server_hello(tls_state_t *tls) hash_handshake(tls, "<< server hello hash:%s", tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN, len ); + */ } static void get_server_cert(tls_state_t *tls) @@ -1548,7 +1723,7 @@ static void process_server_key(tls_state_t *tls, int len) // 64523d6216cb94c43c9b20e377d8c52c55be6703fd6730a155930c705eaf3af6 //32bytes //same about this item ^^^^^ -//seen from www.openbsd.org +//seen from ftp.openbsd.org //(which only accepts ECDHE-RSA-AESnnn-GCM-SHAnnn and ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphers): // 0c 000228 //SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, len // 03 //curve_type: named curve @@ -1572,6 +1747,7 @@ static void process_server_key(tls_state_t *tls, int len) bb_error_msg_and_die("elliptic curve is not x25519"); memcpy(tls->hsd->ecc_pub_key32, keybuf + 4, 32); + tls->flags |= GOT_EC_KEY; dbg("got eccPubKey\n"); } @@ -1612,7 +1788,11 @@ static void send_client_key_exchange(tls_state_t *tls) int premaster_size; int len; - if (tls->hsd->key_alg == KEY_ALG_RSA) { + if (!(tls->flags & NEED_EC_KEY)) { + /* RSA */ + if (!(tls->flags & GOT_CERT_RSA_KEY_ALG)) + bb_error_msg("server cert is not RSA"); + tls_get_random(rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster)); if (TLS_DEBUG_FIXED_SECRETS) memset(rsa_premaster, 0x44, sizeof(rsa_premaster)); @@ -1636,10 +1816,13 @@ static void send_client_key_exchange(tls_state_t *tls) premaster = rsa_premaster; premaster_size = sizeof(rsa_premaster); } else { - /* KEY_ALG_ECDSA */ + /* ECDHE */ static const uint8_t basepoint9[CURVE25519_KEYSIZE] = {9}; uint8_t privkey[CURVE25519_KEYSIZE]; //[32] + if (!(tls->flags & GOT_EC_KEY)) + bb_error_msg("server did not provide EC key"); + /* Generate random private key, see RFC 7748 */ tls_get_random(privkey, sizeof(privkey)); privkey[0] &= 0xf8; @@ -1727,23 +1910,32 @@ static void send_client_key_exchange(tls_state_t *tls) memcpy(&tmp64[32], &tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32[0] , 32); prf_hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ - tls->client_write_MAC_key, 2 * (tls->MAC_size + tls->key_size), + tls->client_write_MAC_key, 2 * (tls->MAC_size + tls->key_size + tls->IV_size), // also fills: // server_write_MAC_key[] // client_write_key[] // server_write_key[] + // client_write_IV[] + // server_write_IV[] tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret), "key expansion", tmp64, 64 ); tls->client_write_key = tls->client_write_MAC_key + (2 * tls->MAC_size); tls->server_write_key = tls->client_write_key + tls->key_size; + tls->client_write_IV = tls->server_write_key + tls->key_size; + tls->server_write_IV = tls->client_write_IV + tls->IV_size; dump_hex("client_write_MAC_key:%s\n", tls->client_write_MAC_key, tls->MAC_size ); dump_hex("client_write_key:%s\n", tls->client_write_key, tls->key_size ); + dump_hex("client_write_IV:%s\n", + tls->client_write_IV, tls->IV_size + ); + aesgcm_setkey(tls->H, &tls->aes_encrypt, tls->client_write_key, tls->key_size); + aes_setkey(&tls->aes_decrypt, tls->server_write_key, tls->key_size); } } @@ -1876,7 +2068,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC tls_handshake(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni) // client. dbg("<< SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE len:%u\n", len); dump_raw_in("<< %s\n", tls->inbuf, RECHDR_LEN + len); - if (tls->hsd->key_alg == KEY_ALG_ECDSA) + if (tls->flags & NEED_EC_KEY) process_server_key(tls, len); // read next handshake block @@ -1922,18 +2114,22 @@ void FAST_FUNC tls_handshake(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni) if (len != 1 || memcmp(tls->inbuf, rec_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 6) != 0) bad_record_die(tls, "switch to encrypted traffic", len); dbg("<< CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC\n"); + if (CIPHER_ID1 == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 && tls->cipher_id == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 ) { tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = tls->MAC_size; - } else { - unsigned mac_blocks = (unsigned)(tls->MAC_size + AES_BLOCKSIZE-1) / AES_BLOCKSIZE; + } else + if (!(tls->flags & ENCRYPTION_AESGCM)) { + unsigned mac_blocks = (unsigned)(tls->MAC_size + AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1) / AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* all incoming packets now should be encrypted and have * at least IV + (MAC padded to blocksize): */ - tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = AES_BLOCKSIZE + (mac_blocks * AES_BLOCKSIZE); - dbg("min_encrypted_len_on_read: %u", tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read); + tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = AES_BLOCK_SIZE + (mac_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } else { + tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = 8 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } + dbg("min_encrypted_len_on_read: %u\n", tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read); /* Get (encrypted) FINISHED from the server */ len = tls_xread_record(tls, "'server finished'"); |