From d4681c7293da6aeb901101b5bc239229f4963926 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denys Vlasenko Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 10:33:23 +0100 Subject: tls: simplify hmac_begin() function old new delta hmac_begin 196 158 -38 Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko --- networking/tls.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'networking/tls.c') diff --git a/networking/tls.c b/networking/tls.c index e76a78585..002983273 100644 --- a/networking/tls.c +++ b/networking/tls.c @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ enum { OUTBUF_PFX = 8 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* header + IV */ OUTBUF_SFX = TLS_MAX_MAC_SIZE + TLS_MAX_CRYPTBLOCK_SIZE, /* MAC + padding */ - // RFC 5246 + // RFC 5246: // | 6.2.1. Fragmentation // | The record layer fragments information blocks into TLSPlaintext // | records carrying data in chunks of 2^14 bytes or less. Client @@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static void hash_handshake(tls_state_t *tls, const char *fmt, const void *buffer #endif } -// RFC 2104 +// RFC 2104: // HMAC(key, text) based on a hash H (say, sha256) is: // ipad = [0x36 x INSIZE] // opad = [0x5c x INSIZE] @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static void hmac_begin(hmac_precomputed_t *pre, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size, { uint8_t key_xor_ipad[SHA_INSIZE]; uint8_t key_xor_opad[SHA_INSIZE]; - uint8_t tempkey[SHA1_OUTSIZE < SHA256_OUTSIZE ? SHA256_OUTSIZE : SHA1_OUTSIZE]; +// uint8_t tempkey[SHA1_OUTSIZE < SHA256_OUTSIZE ? SHA256_OUTSIZE : SHA1_OUTSIZE]; unsigned i; // "The authentication key can be of any length up to INSIZE, the @@ -456,10 +456,18 @@ static void hmac_begin(hmac_precomputed_t *pre, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size, // than INSIZE bytes will first hash the key using H and then use the // resultant OUTSIZE byte string as the actual key to HMAC." if (key_size > SHA_INSIZE) { - md5sha_ctx_t ctx; - begin(&ctx); - md5sha_hash(&ctx, key, key_size); - key_size = sha_end(&ctx, tempkey); + bb_error_msg_and_die("HMAC key>64"); //does not happen (yet?) +// md5sha_ctx_t ctx; +// begin(&ctx); +// md5sha_hash(&ctx, key, key_size); +// key_size = sha_end(&ctx, tempkey); +// //key = tempkey; - right? RIGHT? why does it work without this? +// // because SHA_INSIZE is 64, but hmac() is always called with +// // key_size = tls->MAC_size = SHA1/256_OUTSIZE (20 or 32), +// // and prf_hmac_sha256() -> hmac_sha256() key sizes are: +// // - RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE is 48 +// // - CURVE25519_KEYSIZE is 32 +// // - master_secret[] is 48 } for (i = 0; i < key_size; i++) { @@ -519,8 +527,9 @@ static unsigned hmac_sha256(/*tls_state_t *tls,*/ uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, un // document and in TLS documents published prior to this document when // TLS 1.2 is negotiated. // ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ IMPORTANT! -// PRF uses sha256 regardless of cipher (at least for all ciphers -// defined by RFC5246). It's not sha1 for AES_128_CBC_SHA! +// PRF uses sha256 regardless of cipher for all ciphers +// defined by RFC 5246. It's not sha1 for AES_128_CBC_SHA! +// However, for _SHA384 ciphers, it's sha384. See RFC 5288,5289. //... // P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + // HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + @@ -542,6 +551,12 @@ static unsigned hmac_sha256(/*tls_state_t *tls,*/ uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, un // PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_(secret, label + seed) // // The label is an ASCII string. +// +// RFC 5288: +// For cipher suites ending with _SHA256, the PRF is the TLS PRF +// with SHA-256 as the hash function. +// For cipher suites ending with _SHA384, the PRF is the TLS PRF +// with SHA-384 as the hash function. static void prf_hmac_sha256(/*tls_state_t *tls,*/ uint8_t *outbuf, unsigned outbuf_size, uint8_t *secret, unsigned secret_size, @@ -675,7 +690,7 @@ static void xwrite_encrypted_and_hmac_signed(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, un size += tls->MAC_size; - // RFC 5246 + // RFC 5246: // 6.2.3.1. Null or Standard Stream Cipher // // Stream ciphers (including BulkCipherAlgorithm.null; see Appendix A.6) @@ -1467,6 +1482,7 @@ static void send_client_hello_and_alloc_hsd(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni) // 0xC0,0x28, // TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 - can't do SHA384 yet 0xC0,0x2B, // 6 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ok: wget https://is.gd/ // 0xC0,0x2C, // TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - wget https://is.gd/: "TLS error from peer (alert code 20): bad MAC" +//TODO: GCM_SHA384 ciphers can be supported, only need sha384-based PRF? 0xC0,0x2F, // 7 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 // 0xC0,0x30, // TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384: "decryption failed or bad record mac" //possibly these too: @@ -1489,7 +1505,7 @@ static void send_client_hello_and_alloc_hsd(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni) 0x00,0x0a, //extension_type: "supported_groups" 0x00,0x04, //ext len 0x00,0x02, //list len - 0x00,0x1d, //curve_x25519 (rfc7748) + 0x00,0x1d, //curve_x25519 (RFC 7748) //0x00,0x17, //curve_secp256r1 //0x00,0x18, //curve_secp384r1 //0x00,0x19, //curve_secp521r1 -- cgit v1.2.3