From 89193f985bf50af702e0f98a3c86573277c03287 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denys Vlasenko Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2017 18:08:07 +0100 Subject: tls: can download kernels now :) Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko --- networking/tls.c | 172 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 120 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) (limited to 'networking') diff --git a/networking/tls.c b/networking/tls.c index dc94a8b9b..335324568 100644 --- a/networking/tls.c +++ b/networking/tls.c @@ -53,15 +53,14 @@ // ok: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher AES128-SHA // (TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - in TLS 1.2 it's mandated to be always supported) #define CIPHER_ID1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 // no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE from peer -// Does not work yet: -//#define CIPHER_ID2 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define CIPHER_ID2 0 +// Works with "wget https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/linux-4.9.5.tar.xz" +#define CIPHER_ID2 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DEBUG 1 -#define TLS_DEBUG_HASH 1 -#define TLS_DEBUG_DER 1 -#define TLS_DEBUG_FIXED_SECRETS 1 +#define TLS_DEBUG 0 +#define TLS_DEBUG_HASH 0 +#define TLS_DEBUG_DER 0 +#define TLS_DEBUG_FIXED_SECRETS 0 #if 0 # define dump_raw_out(...) dump_hex(__VA_ARGS__) #else @@ -340,51 +339,48 @@ static void hash_handshake(tls_state_t *tls, const char *fmt, const void *buffer // if we often need HMAC hmac with the same key. // // text is often given in disjoint pieces. -static unsigned hmac_sha_precomputed_v(uint8_t *out, - md5sha_ctx_t *hashed_key_xor_ipad, - md5sha_ctx_t *hashed_key_xor_opad, +typedef struct hmac_precomputed { + md5sha_ctx_t hashed_key_xor_ipad; + md5sha_ctx_t hashed_key_xor_opad; +} hmac_precomputed_t; + +static unsigned hmac_sha_precomputed_v( + hmac_precomputed_t *pre, + uint8_t *out, va_list va) { uint8_t *text; unsigned len; - /* hashed_key_xor_ipad contains unclosed "H((key XOR ipad) +" state */ - /* hashed_key_xor_opad contains unclosed "H((key XOR opad) +" state */ + /* pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad contains unclosed "H((key XOR ipad) +" state */ + /* pre->hashed_key_xor_opad contains unclosed "H((key XOR opad) +" state */ /* calculate out = H((key XOR ipad) + text) */ while ((text = va_arg(va, uint8_t*)) != NULL) { unsigned text_size = va_arg(va, unsigned); - md5sha_hash(hashed_key_xor_ipad, text, text_size); + md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad, text, text_size); } - len = sha_end(hashed_key_xor_ipad, out); + len = sha_end(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad, out); /* out = H((key XOR opad) + out) */ - md5sha_hash(hashed_key_xor_opad, out, len); - return sha_end(hashed_key_xor_opad, out); + md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad, out, len); + return sha_end(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad, out); } -static unsigned hmac(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size, ...) +static void hmac_sha256_begin(hmac_precomputed_t *pre, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size) { - md5sha_ctx_t hashed_key_xor_ipad; - md5sha_ctx_t hashed_key_xor_opad; uint8_t key_xor_ipad[SHA_INSIZE]; uint8_t key_xor_opad[SHA_INSIZE]; uint8_t tempkey[SHA256_OUTSIZE]; - va_list va; unsigned i; - va_start(va, key_size); - // "The authentication key can be of any length up to INSIZE, the // block length of the hash function. Applications that use keys longer // than INSIZE bytes will first hash the key using H and then use the // resultant OUTSIZE byte string as the actual key to HMAC." if (key_size > SHA_INSIZE) { md5sha_ctx_t ctx; - if (tls->MAC_size == SHA256_OUTSIZE) - sha256_begin(&ctx); - else - sha1_begin(&ctx); + sha256_begin(&ctx); md5sha_hash(&ctx, key, key_size); key_size = sha_end(&ctx, tempkey); } @@ -398,19 +394,77 @@ static unsigned hmac(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_ key_xor_opad[i] = 0x5c; } - if (tls->MAC_size == SHA256_OUTSIZE) { - sha256_begin(&hashed_key_xor_ipad); - sha256_begin(&hashed_key_xor_opad); - } else { - sha1_begin(&hashed_key_xor_ipad); - sha1_begin(&hashed_key_xor_opad); + sha256_begin(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad); + sha256_begin(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad); + md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad, key_xor_ipad, SHA_INSIZE); + md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad, key_xor_opad, SHA_INSIZE); +} +// TODO: ^^^ vvv merge? +static void hmac_sha1_begin(hmac_precomputed_t *pre, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size) +{ + uint8_t key_xor_ipad[SHA_INSIZE]; + uint8_t key_xor_opad[SHA_INSIZE]; + uint8_t tempkey[SHA1_OUTSIZE]; + unsigned i; + + // "The authentication key can be of any length up to INSIZE, the + // block length of the hash function. Applications that use keys longer + // than INSIZE bytes will first hash the key using H and then use the + // resultant OUTSIZE byte string as the actual key to HMAC." + if (key_size > SHA_INSIZE) { + md5sha_ctx_t ctx; + sha1_begin(&ctx); + md5sha_hash(&ctx, key, key_size); + key_size = sha_end(&ctx, tempkey); + } + + for (i = 0; i < key_size; i++) { + key_xor_ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36; + key_xor_opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c; + } + for (; i < SHA_INSIZE; i++) { + key_xor_ipad[i] = 0x36; + key_xor_opad[i] = 0x5c; } - md5sha_hash(&hashed_key_xor_ipad, key_xor_ipad, SHA_INSIZE); - md5sha_hash(&hashed_key_xor_opad, key_xor_opad, SHA_INSIZE); - i = hmac_sha_precomputed_v(out, &hashed_key_xor_ipad, &hashed_key_xor_opad, va); + sha1_begin(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad); + sha1_begin(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad); + md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad, key_xor_ipad, SHA_INSIZE); + md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad, key_xor_opad, SHA_INSIZE); +} + +static unsigned hmac(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size, ...) +{ + hmac_precomputed_t pre; + va_list va; + unsigned len; + + va_start(va, key_size); + + if (tls->MAC_size == SHA256_OUTSIZE) + hmac_sha256_begin(&pre, key, key_size); + else + hmac_sha1_begin(&pre, key, key_size); + + len = hmac_sha_precomputed_v(&pre, out, va); + va_end(va); - return i; + return len; +} + +static unsigned hmac_sha256(/*tls_state_t *tls,*/ uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size, ...) +{ + hmac_precomputed_t pre; + va_list va; + unsigned len; + + va_start(va, key_size); + + hmac_sha256_begin(&pre, key, key_size); + len = hmac_sha_precomputed_v(&pre, out, va); + + va_end(va); + return len; } // RFC 5246: @@ -420,6 +474,9 @@ static unsigned hmac(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_ // SHA-256 hash function is used for all cipher suites defined in this // document and in TLS documents published prior to this document when // TLS 1.2 is negotiated. +// ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ IMPORTANT! +// PRF uses sha256 regardless of cipher (at least for all ciphers +// defined by RFC5246). It's not sha1 for AES_128_CBC_SHA! //... // P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + // HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + @@ -441,7 +498,7 @@ static unsigned hmac(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_ // PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_(secret, label + seed) // // The label is an ASCII string. -static void prf_hmac(tls_state_t *tls, +static void prf_hmac_sha256(/*tls_state_t *tls,*/ uint8_t *outbuf, unsigned outbuf_size, uint8_t *secret, unsigned secret_size, const char *label, @@ -450,7 +507,7 @@ static void prf_hmac(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t a[TLS_MAX_MAC_SIZE]; uint8_t *out_p = outbuf; unsigned label_size = strlen(label); - unsigned MAC_size = tls->MAC_size; + unsigned MAC_size = SHA256_OUTSIZE;///tls->MAC_size; /* In P_hash() calculation, "seed" is "label + seed": */ #define SEED label, label_size, seed, seed_size @@ -458,7 +515,7 @@ static void prf_hmac(tls_state_t *tls, #define A a, MAC_size /* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, seed) */ - hmac(tls, a, SECRET, SEED, NULL); + hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ a, SECRET, SEED, NULL); //TODO: convert hmac to precomputed for(;;) { @@ -466,16 +523,16 @@ static void prf_hmac(tls_state_t *tls, if (outbuf_size <= MAC_size) { /* Last, possibly incomplete, block */ /* (use a[] as temp buffer) */ - hmac(tls, a, SECRET, A, SEED, NULL); + hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ a, SECRET, A, SEED, NULL); memcpy(out_p, a, outbuf_size); return; } /* Not last block. Store directly to result buffer */ - hmac(tls, out_p, SECRET, A, SEED, NULL); + hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ out_p, SECRET, A, SEED, NULL); out_p += MAC_size; outbuf_size -= MAC_size; /* A(2) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1)) */ - hmac(tls, a, SECRET, A, NULL); + hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ a, SECRET, A, NULL); } #undef A #undef SECRET @@ -823,9 +880,10 @@ static int tls_xread_record(tls_state_t *tls) int padding_len; if (sz & (AES_BLOCKSIZE-1) - || sz < tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read + || sz < (int)tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read ) { - bb_error_msg_and_die("bad encrypted len:%u", sz); + bb_error_msg_and_die("bad encrypted len:%u < %u", + sz, tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read); } /* Decrypt content+MAC+padding, moving it over IV in the process */ psAesInit(&ctx, p, /* IV */ @@ -1301,13 +1359,17 @@ static void get_server_hello(tls_state_t *tls) if (cipher == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) { tls->key_size = AES128_KEYSIZE; tls->MAC_size = SHA1_OUTSIZE; - sha1_begin(&tls->hsd->handshake_hash_ctx); } else { /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */ tls->key_size = AES256_KEYSIZE; tls->MAC_size = SHA256_OUTSIZE; - sha256_begin(&tls->hsd->handshake_hash_ctx); } + /* Handshake hash eventually destined to FINISHED record + * is sha256 regardless of cipher + * (at least for all ciphers defined by RFC5246). + * It's not sha1 for AES_128_CBC_SHA - only MAC is sha1, not this hash. + */ + sha256_begin(&tls->hsd->handshake_hash_ctx); hash_handshake(tls, ">> client hello hash:%s", tls->hsd->saved_client_hello, tls->hsd->saved_client_hello_size ); @@ -1389,6 +1451,7 @@ static void send_client_key_exchange(tls_state_t *tls) // version negotiated for the connection." rsa_premaster[0] = TLS_MAJ; rsa_premaster[1] = TLS_MIN; + dump_hex("premaster:%s\n", rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster)); len = psRsaEncryptPub(/*pool:*/ NULL, /* psRsaKey_t* */ &tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key, rsa_premaster, /*inlen:*/ sizeof(rsa_premaster), @@ -1417,7 +1480,7 @@ static void send_client_key_exchange(tls_state_t *tls) // [0..47]; // The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length. The length // of the premaster secret will vary depending on key exchange method. - prf_hmac(tls, + prf_hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret), rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster), "master secret", @@ -1465,7 +1528,7 @@ static void send_client_key_exchange(tls_state_t *tls) memcpy(&tmp64[0] , &tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32[32], 32); memcpy(&tmp64[32], &tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32[0] , 32); - prf_hmac(tls, + prf_hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ tls->client_write_MAC_key, 2 * (tls->MAC_size + tls->key_size), // also fills: // server_write_MAC_key[] @@ -1548,7 +1611,7 @@ static void send_client_finished(tls_state_t *tls) fill_handshake_record_hdr(record, HANDSHAKE_FINISHED, sizeof(*record)); len = get_handshake_hash(tls, handshake_hash); - prf_hmac(tls, + prf_hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ record->prf_result, sizeof(record->prf_result), tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret), "client finished", @@ -1645,9 +1708,14 @@ void FAST_FUNC tls_handshake(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni) dbg("<< CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC\n"); if (tls->cipher_id == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256) tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = tls->MAC_size; - else - /* all incoming packets now should be encrypted and have IV + MAC + padding */ - tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = AES_BLOCKSIZE + tls->MAC_size + AES_BLOCKSIZE; + else { + unsigned mac_blocks = (unsigned)(tls->MAC_size + AES_BLOCKSIZE-1) / AES_BLOCKSIZE; + /* all incoming packets now should be encrypted and have + * at least IV + (MAC padded to blocksize): + */ + tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = AES_BLOCKSIZE + (mac_blocks * AES_BLOCKSIZE); + dbg("min_encrypted_len_on_read: %u", tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read); + } /* Get (encrypted) FINISHED from the server */ len = tls_xread_record(tls); -- cgit v1.2.3