/* * Copyright (C) 2017 Denys Vlasenko * * Licensed under GPLv2, see file LICENSE in this source tree. */ //config:config TLS //config: bool "tls (debugging)" //config: default n //applet:IF_TLS(APPLET(tls, BB_DIR_USR_BIN, BB_SUID_DROP)) //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm.o //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_montgomery_reduce.o //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_mul_comba.o //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_sqr_comba.o //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_rsa.o ////kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_ciphers.o ////kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_aes.o ////kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_aes_gcm.o //usage:#define tls_trivial_usage //usage: "HOST[:PORT]" //usage:#define tls_full_usage "\n\n" #include "tls.h" #if 1 # define dbg(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__) #else # define dbg(...) ((void)0) #endif #define RECORD_TYPE_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20 #define RECORD_TYPE_ALERT 21 #define RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE 22 #define RECORD_TYPE_APPLICATION_DATA 23 #define HANDSHAKE_HELLO_REQUEST 0 #define HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO 1 #define HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO 2 #define HANDSHAKE_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 #define HANDSHAKE_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4 #define HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE 11 #define HANDSHAKE_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12 #define HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13 #define HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO_DONE 14 #define HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15 #define HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 #define HANDSHAKE_FINISHED 20 #define SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE 32 #define SSL_HS_RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE 48 #define SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL 0x0000 #define SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x0001 #define SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0002 #define SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x0004 #define SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0005 #define SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x000A /* 10 */ #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x002F /* 47 */ #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0035 /* 53 */ #define TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV 0x00FF #define TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA 0x0007 /* 7 */ #define SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0016 /* 22 */ #define SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x0018 /* 24 */ #define SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x001B /* 27 */ #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0033 /* 51 */ #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0039 /* 57 */ #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0067 /* 103 */ #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x006B /* 107 */ #define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0034 /* 52 */ #define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x003A /* 58 */ #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x003C /* 60 */ #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x003D /* 61 */ #define TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA 0x0096 /* 150 */ #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x008C /* 140 */ #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x00AE /* 174 */ #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0x00AF /* 175 */ #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x008D /* 141 */ #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0090 /* 144 */ #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0091 /* 145 */ #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 /* 49156 */ #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 /* 49157 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 /* 49161 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A /* 49162 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 /* 49170 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 /* 49171 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 /* 49172 */ #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E /* 49166 */ #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F /* 49167 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /* 49187 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /* 49188 */ #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC025 /* 49189 */ #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC026 /* 49190 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC027 /* 49191 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC028 /* 49192 */ #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC029 /* 49193 */ #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC02A /* 49194 */ #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x009C /* 156 */ #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x009D /* 157 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B /* 49195 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02C /* 49196 */ #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02D /* 49197 */ #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02E /* 49198 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F /* 49199 */ #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030 /* 49200 */ #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 /* 49201 */ #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /* 49202 */ //Tested against kernel.org: //TLS 1.1 //#define TLS_MAJ 3 //#define TLS_MIN 2 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE //TLS 1.2 #define TLS_MAJ 3 #define TLS_MIN 3 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE *** matrixssl uses this on my box //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE // All GCMs: //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE #define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE *** select this? //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE //^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (tested b/c this one doesn't req server certs... no luck) //test TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, in tls 1.2 it's mandated to be always supported struct record_hdr { uint8_t type; uint8_t proto_maj, proto_min; uint8_t len16_hi, len16_lo; }; typedef struct tls_state { int fd; psRsaKey_t server_rsa_pub_key; // RFC 5246 // |6.2.1. Fragmentation // | The record layer fragments information blocks into TLSPlaintext // | records carrying data in chunks of 2^14 bytes or less. Client // | message boundaries are not preserved in the record layer (i.e., // | multiple client messages of the same ContentType MAY be coalesced // | into a single TLSPlaintext record, or a single message MAY be // | fragmented across several records) // |... // | length // | The length (in bytes) of the following TLSPlaintext.fragment. // | The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14. // |... // | 6.2.2. Record Compression and Decompression // |... // | Compression must be lossless and may not increase the content length // | by more than 1024 bytes. If the decompression function encounters a // | TLSCompressed.fragment that would decompress to a length in excess of // | 2^14 bytes, it MUST report a fatal decompression failure error. // |... // | length // | The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCompressed.fragment. // | The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 1024. // // Since our buffer also contains 5-byte headers, make it a bit bigger: int insize; int tail; uint8_t inbuf[18*1024]; } tls_state_t; void tls_get_random(void *buf, unsigned len) { if (len != open_read_close("/dev/urandom", buf, len)) xfunc_die(); } static tls_state_t *new_tls_state(void) { tls_state_t *tls = xzalloc(sizeof(*tls)); tls->fd = -1; return tls; } static unsigned get24be(const uint8_t *p) { return 0x100*(0x100*p[0] + p[1]) + p[2]; } static void dump(const void *vp, int len) { char hexbuf[32 * 1024 + 4]; const uint8_t *p = vp; while (len > 0) { unsigned xhdr_len; if (len < 5) { bin2hex(hexbuf, (void*)p, len)[0] = '\0'; dbg("< |%s|\n", hexbuf); return; } xhdr_len = 0x100*p[3] + p[4]; dbg("< hdr_type:%u ver:%u.%u len:%u", p[0], p[1], p[2], xhdr_len); p += 5; len -= 5; if (len >= 4 && p[-5] == RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE) { unsigned len24 = get24be(p + 1); dbg(" type:%u len24:%u", p[0], len24); } if (xhdr_len > len) xhdr_len = len; bin2hex(hexbuf, (void*)p, xhdr_len)[0] = '\0'; dbg(" |%s|\n", hexbuf); p += xhdr_len; len -= xhdr_len; } } static void tls_error_die(tls_state_t *tls) { dump(tls->inbuf, tls->insize + tls->tail); xfunc_die(); } static int xread_tls_block(tls_state_t *tls) { struct record_hdr *xhdr; int len; int total; int target; dbg("insize:%u tail:%u\n", tls->insize, tls->tail); memmove(tls->inbuf, tls->inbuf + tls->insize, tls->tail); errno = 0; total = tls->tail; target = sizeof(tls->inbuf); for (;;) { if (total >= sizeof(*xhdr) && target == sizeof(tls->inbuf)) { xhdr = (void*)tls->inbuf; target = sizeof(*xhdr) + (0x100 * xhdr->len16_hi + xhdr->len16_lo); if (target >= sizeof(tls->inbuf)) { /* malformed input (too long): yell and die */ tls->tail = 0; tls->insize = total; tls_error_die(tls); } // can also check type/proto_maj/proto_min here } /* if total >= target, we have a full packet (and possibly more)... */ if (total - target >= 0) break; len = safe_read(tls->fd, tls->inbuf + total, sizeof(tls->inbuf) - total); if (len <= 0) bb_perror_msg_and_die("short read"); total += len; } tls->tail = total - target; tls->insize = target; target -= sizeof(*xhdr); dbg("got block len:%u\n", target); return target; } static int xread_tls_handshake_block(tls_state_t *tls, int min_len) { struct record_hdr *xhdr; int len = xread_tls_block(tls); xhdr = (void*)tls->inbuf; if (len < min_len || xhdr->type != RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE || xhdr->proto_maj != TLS_MAJ || xhdr->proto_min != TLS_MIN ) { tls_error_die(tls); } dbg("got HANDSHAKE\n"); return len; } static unsigned get_der_len(uint8_t **bodyp, uint8_t *der, uint8_t *end) { unsigned len, len1; if (end - der < 2) xfunc_die(); // if ((der[0] & 0x1f) == 0x1f) /* not single-byte item code? */ // xfunc_die(); len = der[1]; /* maybe it's short len */ if (len >= 0x80) { /* no */ if (end - der < (int)(len - 0x7e)) /* need 3 or 4 bytes for 81, 82 */ xfunc_die(); len1 = der[2]; if (len == 0x81) { /* it's "ii 81 xx" */ } else if (len == 0x82) { /* it's "ii 82 xx yy" */ len1 = 0x100*len1 + der[3]; der += 1; /* skip [yy] */ } else { /* 0x80 is "0 bytes of len", invalid DER: must use short len if can */ /* >0x82 is "3+ bytes of len", should not happen realistically */ xfunc_die(); } der += 1; /* skip [xx] */ len = len1; // if (len < 0x80) // xfunc_die(); /* invalid DER: must use short len if can */ } der += 2; /* skip [code]+[1byte] */ if (end - der < (int)len) xfunc_die(); *bodyp = der; return len; } static uint8_t *enter_der_item(uint8_t *der, uint8_t **endp) { uint8_t *new_der; unsigned len = get_der_len(&new_der, der, *endp); dbg("entered der @%p:0x%02x len:%u inner_byte @%p:0x%02x\n", der, der[0], len, new_der, new_der[0]); /* Move "end" position to cover only this item */ *endp = new_der + len; return new_der; } static uint8_t *skip_der_item(uint8_t *der, uint8_t *end) { uint8_t *new_der; unsigned len = get_der_len(&new_der, der, end); /* Skip body */ new_der += len; dbg("skipped der 0x%02x, next byte 0x%02x\n", der[0], new_der[0]); return new_der; } static void der_binary_to_pstm(pstm_int *pstm_n, uint8_t *der, uint8_t *end) { uint8_t *bin_ptr; unsigned len = get_der_len(&bin_ptr, der, end); dbg("binary bytes:%u, first:0x%02x\n", len, bin_ptr[0]); pstm_init_for_read_unsigned_bin(/*pool:*/ NULL, pstm_n, len); pstm_read_unsigned_bin(pstm_n, bin_ptr, len); //return bin + len; } static void find_key_in_der_cert(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *der, int len) { /* Certificate is a DER-encoded data structure. Each DER element has a length, * which makes it easy to skip over large compound elements of any complexity * without parsing them. Example: partial decode of kernel.org certificate: * SEQ 0x05ac/1452 bytes (Certificate): 308205ac * SEQ 0x0494/1172 bytes (tbsCertificate): 30820494 * [ASN_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | ASN_CONSTRUCTED | 0] 3 bytes: a003 * INTEGER (version): 0201 02 * INTEGER 0x11 bytes (serialNumber): 0211 00 9f85bf664b0cddafca508679501b2be4 * //^^^^^^note: matrixSSL also allows [ASN_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | ASN_PRIMITIVE | 2] = 0x82 type * SEQ 0x0d bytes (signatureAlgo): 300d * OID 9 bytes: 0609 2a864886f70d01010b (OID_SHA256_RSA_SIG 42.134.72.134.247.13.1.1.11) * NULL: 0500 * SEQ 0x5f bytes (issuer): 305f * SET 11 bytes: 310b * SEQ 9 bytes: 3009 * OID 3 bytes: 0603 550406 * Printable string "FR": 1302 4652 * SET 14 bytes: 310e * SEQ 12 bytes: 300c * OID 3 bytes: 0603 550408 * Printable string "Paris": 1305 5061726973 * SET 14 bytes: 310e * SEQ 12 bytes: 300c * OID 3 bytes: 0603 550407 * Printable string "Paris": 1305 5061726973 * SET 14 bytes: 310e * SEQ 12 bytes: 300c * OID 3 bytes: 0603 55040a * Printable string "Gandi": 1305 47616e6469 * SET 32 bytes: 3120 * SEQ 30 bytes: 301e * OID 3 bytes: 0603 550403 * Printable string "Gandi Standard SSL CA 2": 1317 47616e6469205374616e646172642053534c2043412032 * SEQ 30 bytes (validity): 301e * TIME "161011000000Z": 170d 3136313031313030303030305a * TIME "191011235959Z": 170d 3139313031313233353935395a * SEQ 0x5b/91 bytes (subject): 305b //I did not decode this * 3121301f060355040b1318446f6d61696e20436f * 6e74726f6c2056616c6964617465643121301f06 * 0355040b1318506f73697469766553534c204d75 * 6c74692d446f6d61696e31133011060355040313 * 0a6b65726e656c2e6f7267 * SEQ 0x01a2/418 bytes (subjectPublicKeyInfo): 308201a2 * SEQ 13 bytes (algorithm): 300d * OID 9 bytes: 0609 2a864886f70d010101 (OID_RSA_KEY_ALG 42.134.72.134.247.13.1.1.1) * NULL: 0500 * BITSTRING 0x018f/399 bytes (publicKey): 0382018f * ????: 00 * //after the zero byte, it appears key itself uses DER encoding: * SEQ 0x018a/394 bytes: 3082018a * INTEGER 0x0181/385 bytes (modulus): 02820181 * 00b1ab2fc727a3bef76780c9349bf3 * ...24 more blocks of 15 bytes each... * 90e895291c6bc8693b65 * INTEGER 3 bytes (exponent): 0203 010001 * [ASN_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | ASN_CONSTRUCTED | 0x3] 0x01e5 bytes (X509v3 extensions): a38201e5 * SEQ 0x01e1 bytes: 308201e1 * ... * Certificate is a sequence of three elements: * tbsCertificate (SEQ) * signatureAlgorithm (AlgorithmIdentifier) * signatureValue (BIT STRING) * * In turn, tbsCertificate is a sequence of: * version * serialNumber * signatureAlgo (AlgorithmIdentifier) * issuer (Name, has complex structure) * validity (Validity, SEQ of two Times) * subject (Name) * subjectPublicKeyInfo (SEQ) * ... * * subjectPublicKeyInfo is a sequence of: * algorithm (AlgorithmIdentifier) * publicKey (BIT STRING) * * We need Certificate.tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey */ uint8_t *end = der + len; /* enter "Certificate" item: [der, end) will be only Cert */ der = enter_der_item(der, &end); /* enter "tbsCertificate" item: [der, end) will be only tbsCert */ der = enter_der_item(der, &end); /* skip up to subjectPublicKeyInfo */ der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* version */ der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* serialNumber */ der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* signatureAlgo */ der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* issuer */ der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* validity */ der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* subject */ /* enter subjectPublicKeyInfo */ der = enter_der_item(der, &end); { /* check subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm */ static const uint8_t expected[] = { 0x30,0x0d, // SEQ 13 bytes 0x06,0x09, 0x2a,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xf7,0x0d,0x01,0x01,0x01, // OID RSA_KEY_ALG 42.134.72.134.247.13.1.1.1 //0x05,0x00, // NULL }; if (memcmp(der, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0) bb_error_msg_and_die("not RSA key"); } /* skip subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm */ der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* enter subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey */ // die_if_not_this_der_type(der, end, 0x03); /* must be BITSTRING */ der = enter_der_item(der, &end); /* parse RSA key: */ //based on getAsnRsaPubKey(), pkcs1ParsePrivBin() is also of note dbg("key bytes:%u, first:0x%02x\n", (int)(end - der), der[0]); if (end - der < 14) xfunc_die(); /* example format: * ignore bits: 00 * SEQ 0x018a/394 bytes: 3082018a * INTEGER 0x0181/385 bytes (modulus): 02820181 XX...XXX * INTEGER 3 bytes (exponent): 0203 010001 */ if (*der != 0) /* "ignore bits", should be 0 */ xfunc_die(); der++; der = enter_der_item(der, &end); /* enter SEQ */ //memset(tls->server_rsa_pub_key, 0, sizeof(tls->server_rsa_pub_key)); der_binary_to_pstm(&tls->server_rsa_pub_key.N, der, end); /* modulus */ der = skip_der_item(der, end); der_binary_to_pstm(&tls->server_rsa_pub_key.e, der, end); /* exponent */ tls->server_rsa_pub_key.size = pstm_unsigned_bin_size(&tls->server_rsa_pub_key.N); dbg("server_rsa_pub_key.size:%d\n", tls->server_rsa_pub_key.size); } /* * TLS Handshake routines */ static void send_client_hello(tls_state_t *tls) { struct client_hello { struct record_hdr xhdr; uint8_t type; uint8_t len24_hi, len24_mid, len24_lo; uint8_t proto_maj, proto_min; uint8_t rand32[32]; uint8_t session_id_len; /* uint8_t session_id[]; */ uint8_t cipherid_len16_hi, cipherid_len16_lo; uint8_t cipherid[2 * 1]; /* actually variable */ uint8_t comprtypes_len; uint8_t comprtypes[1]; /* actually variable */ }; struct client_hello hello; memset(&hello, 0, sizeof(hello)); hello.xhdr.type = RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE; hello.xhdr.proto_maj = TLS_MAJ; hello.xhdr.proto_min = TLS_MIN; //zero: hello.xhdr.len16_hi = (sizeof(hello) - sizeof(hello.xhdr)) >> 8; hello.xhdr.len16_lo = (sizeof(hello) - sizeof(hello.xhdr)); hello.type = HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO; //hello.len24_hi = 0; //zero: hello.len24_mid = (sizeof(hello) - sizeof(hello.xhdr) - 4) >> 8; hello.len24_lo = (sizeof(hello) - sizeof(hello.xhdr) - 4); hello.proto_maj = TLS_MAJ; /* the "requested" version of the protocol, */ hello.proto_min = TLS_MIN; /* can be higher than one in record headers */ tls_get_random(hello.rand32, sizeof(hello.rand32)); //hello.session_id_len = 0; //hello.cipherid_len16_hi = 0; hello.cipherid_len16_lo = 2 * 1; hello.cipherid[0] = CIPHER_ID >> 8; hello.cipherid[1] = CIPHER_ID & 0xff; hello.comprtypes_len = 1; //hello.comprtypes[0] = 0; xwrite(tls->fd, &hello, sizeof(hello)); #if 0 /* dump */ for (;;) { uint8_t buf[16*1024]; sleep(2); len = recv(tls->fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); //MSG_DONTWAIT); if (len < 0) { if (errno == EAGAIN) continue; bb_perror_msg_and_die("recv"); } if (len == 0) break; dump(buf, len); } #endif } static void get_server_hello(tls_state_t *tls) { struct server_hello { struct record_hdr xhdr; uint8_t type; uint8_t len24_hi, len24_mid, len24_lo; uint8_t proto_maj, proto_min; uint8_t rand32[32]; /* first 4 bytes are unix time in BE format */ uint8_t session_id_len; uint8_t session_id[32]; uint8_t cipherid_hi, cipherid_lo; uint8_t comprtype; /* extensions may follow, but only those which client offered in its Hello */ }; struct server_hello *hp; xread_tls_handshake_block(tls, 74); hp = (void*)tls->inbuf; // 74 bytes: // 02 000046 03|03 58|78|cf|c1 50|a5|49|ee|7e|29|48|71|fe|97|fa|e8|2d|19|87|72|90|84|9d|37|a3|f0|cb|6f|5f|e3|3c|2f |20 |d8|1a|78|96|52|d6|91|01|24|b3|d6|5b|b7|d0|6c|b3|e1|78|4e|3c|95|de|74|a0|ba|eb|a7|3a|ff|bd|a2|bf |00|9c |00| //SvHl len=70 maj.min unixtime^^^ 28randbytes^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_^^^ slen sid32bytes^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ cipSel comprSel if (hp->type != HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO || hp->len24_hi != 0 || hp->len24_mid != 0 || hp->len24_lo != 70 || hp->proto_maj != TLS_MAJ || hp->proto_min != TLS_MIN || hp->session_id_len != 32 || hp->cipherid_hi != (CIPHER_ID >> 8) || hp->cipherid_lo != (CIPHER_ID & 0xff) || hp->comprtype != 0 ) { tls_error_die(tls); } dbg("got SERVER_HELLO\n"); } static void get_server_cert(tls_state_t *tls) { struct record_hdr *xhdr; uint8_t *certbuf; int len, len1; len = xread_tls_handshake_block(tls, 10); xhdr = (void*)tls->inbuf; certbuf = (void*)(xhdr + 1); if (certbuf[0] != HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE) tls_error_die(tls); dbg("got CERTIFICATE\n"); // 4392 bytes: // 0b 00|11|24 00|11|21 00|05|b0 30|82|05|ac|30|82|04|94|a0|03|02|01|02|02|11|00|9f|85|bf|66|4b|0c|dd|af|ca|50|86|79|50|1b|2b|e4|30|0d... //Cert len=4388 ChainLen CertLen^ DER encoded X509 starts here. openssl x509 -in FILE -inform DER -noout -text len1 = get24be(certbuf + 1); if (len1 > len - 4) tls_error_die(tls); len = len1; len1 = get24be(certbuf + 4); if (len1 > len - 3) tls_error_die(tls); len = len1; len1 = get24be(certbuf + 7); if (len1 > len - 3) tls_error_die(tls); len = len1; if (len) find_key_in_der_cert(tls, certbuf + 10, len); } static void send_client_key_exchange(tls_state_t *tls) { struct client_key_exchange { struct record_hdr xhdr; uint8_t type; uint8_t len24_hi, len24_mid, len24_lo; uint8_t keylen16_hi, keylen16_lo; /* exist for RSA, but not for some other key types */ //had a bug when had no keylen: we: //write(3, "\x16\x03\x03\x01\x84\x10\x00\x01\x80\xXX\xXX\xXX\xXX\xXX\xXX...", 393) = 393 //openssl: //write to 0xe9a090 [0xf9ac20] (395 bytes => 395 (0x18B)) //0000 - 16 03 03 01 86 10 00 01 -82 01 80 xx xx xx xx xx uint8_t key[384]; // size?? }; struct client_key_exchange record; uint8_t rsa_premaster[SSL_HS_RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE]; memset(&record, 0, sizeof(record)); record.xhdr.type = RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE; record.xhdr.proto_maj = TLS_MAJ; record.xhdr.proto_min = TLS_MIN; record.xhdr.len16_hi = (sizeof(record) - sizeof(record.xhdr)) >> 8; record.xhdr.len16_lo = (sizeof(record) - sizeof(record.xhdr)) & 0xff; record.type = HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; //record.len24_hi = 0; record.len24_mid = (sizeof(record) - sizeof(record.xhdr) - 4) >> 8; record.len24_lo = (sizeof(record) - sizeof(record.xhdr) - 4) & 0xff; record.keylen16_hi = (sizeof(record) - sizeof(record.xhdr) - 6) >> 8; record.keylen16_lo = (sizeof(record) - sizeof(record.xhdr) - 6) & 0xff; tls_get_random(rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster)); // RFC 5246 // "Note: The version number in the PreMasterSecret is the version // offered by the client in the ClientHello.client_version, not the // version negotiated for the connection." rsa_premaster[0] = TLS_MAJ; rsa_premaster[1] = TLS_MIN; psRsaEncryptPub(/*pool:*/ NULL, /* psRsaKey_t* */ &tls->server_rsa_pub_key, rsa_premaster, /*inlen:*/ sizeof(rsa_premaster), record.key, sizeof(record.key), data_param_ignored ); xwrite(tls->fd, &record, sizeof(record)); } static void send_change_cipher_spec(tls_state_t *tls) { static const uint8_t rec[] = { RECORD_TYPE_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, TLS_MAJ, TLS_MIN, 00, 01, 01 }; xwrite(tls->fd, rec, sizeof(rec)); } static void send_client_finished(tls_state_t *tls) { // RFC 5246 on pseudorandom function (PRF): // // 5. HMAC and the Pseudorandom Function //... // In this section, we define one PRF, based on HMAC. This PRF with the // SHA-256 hash function is used for all cipher suites defined in this // document and in TLS documents published prior to this document when // TLS 1.2 is negotiated. //... // P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + // HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + // HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... // where + indicates concatenation. // A() is defined as: // A(0) = seed // A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) // P_hash can be iterated as many times as necessary to produce the // required quantity of data. For example, if P_SHA256 is being used to // create 80 bytes of data, it will have to be iterated three times // (through A(3)), creating 96 bytes of output data; the last 16 bytes // of the final iteration will then be discarded, leaving 80 bytes of // output data. // // TLS's PRF is created by applying P_hash to the secret as: // // PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_(secret, label + seed) // // The label is an ASCII string. tls->fd = 0; // 7.4.9. Finished // A Finished message is always sent immediately after a change // cipher spec message to verify that the key exchange and // authentication processes were successful. It is essential that a // change cipher spec message be received between the other handshake // messages and the Finished message. //... // The Finished message is the first one protected with the just // negotiated algorithms, keys, and secrets. Recipients of Finished // messages MUST verify that the contents are correct. Once a side // has sent its Finished message and received and validated the // Finished message from its peer, it may begin to send and receive // application data over the connection. //... // struct { // opaque verify_data[verify_data_length]; // } Finished; // // verify_data // PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages)) // [0..verify_data_length-1]; // // finished_label // For Finished messages sent by the client, the string // "client finished". For Finished messages sent by the server, // the string "server finished". // // Hash denotes a Hash of the handshake messages. For the PRF // defined in Section 5, the Hash MUST be the Hash used as the basis // for the PRF. Any cipher suite which defines a different PRF MUST // also define the Hash to use in the Finished computation. // // In previous versions of TLS, the verify_data was always 12 octets // long. In the current version of TLS, it depends on the cipher // suite. Any cipher suite which does not explicitly specify // verify_data_length has a verify_data_length equal to 12. This // includes all existing cipher suites. } static void get_change_cipher_spec(tls_state_t *tls) { tls->fd = 0; } static void get_server_finished(tls_state_t *tls) { tls->fd = 0; } static void tls_handshake(tls_state_t *tls) { // Client RFC 5246 Server // (*) - optional messages, not always sent // // ClientHello -------> // ServerHello // Certificate* // ServerKeyExchange* // CertificateRequest* // <------- ServerHelloDone // Certificate* // ClientKeyExchange // CertificateVerify* // [ChangeCipherSpec] // Finished -------> // [ChangeCipherSpec] // <------- Finished // Application Data <------> Application Data int len; send_client_hello(tls); get_server_hello(tls); //RFC 5246 // The server MUST send a Certificate message whenever the agreed- // upon key exchange method uses certificates for authentication // (this includes all key exchange methods defined in this document // except DH_anon). This message will always immediately follow the // ServerHello message. // // IOW: in practice, Certificate *always* follows. // (for example, kernel.org does not even accept DH_anon cipher id) get_server_cert(tls); len = xread_tls_handshake_block(tls, 4); if (tls->inbuf[5] == HANDSHAKE_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { // 459 bytes: // 0c 00|01|c7 03|00|17|41|04|87|94|2e|2f|68|d0|c9|f4|97|a8|2d|ef|ed|67|ea|c6|f3|b3|56|47|5d|27|b6|bd|ee|70|25|30|5e|b0|8e|f6|21|5a... //SvKey len=455^ // with TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: 461 bytes: // 0c 00|01|c9 03|00|17|41|04|cd|9b|b4|29|1f|f6|b0|c2|84|82|7f|29|6a|47|4e|ec|87|0b|c1|9c|69|e1|f8|c6|d0|53|e9|27|90|a5|c8|02|15|75... dbg("got SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE len:%u\n", len); //need to save it xread_tls_handshake_block(tls, 4); } // if (tls->inbuf[5] == HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { // dbg("got CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\n"); //RFC 5246: (in response to this,) "If no suitable certificate is available, // the client MUST send a certificate message containing no // certificates. That is, the certificate_list structure has a // length of zero. ... // Client certificates are sent using the Certificate structure // defined in Section 7.4.2." // (i.e. the same format as server certs) // xread_tls_handshake_block(tls, 4); // } if (tls->inbuf[5] == HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { // 0e 000000 (len:0) dbg("got SERVER_HELLO_DONE\n"); send_client_key_exchange(tls); send_change_cipher_spec(tls); //we now should be able to send encrypted... as soon as we grok AES. send_client_finished(tls); get_change_cipher_spec(tls); get_server_finished(tls); //we now should receive encrypted, and application data can be sent/received } else { tls_error_die(tls); } } int tls_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE; int tls_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) { tls_state_t *tls; len_and_sockaddr *lsa; int fd; // INIT_G(); // getopt32(argv, "myopts") if (!argv[1]) bb_show_usage(); lsa = xhost2sockaddr(argv[1], 443); fd = xconnect_stream(lsa); tls = new_tls_state(); tls->fd = fd; tls_handshake(tls); return EXIT_SUCCESS; }