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author | Rob Landley <rob@landley.net> | 2014-09-26 18:49:44 -0500 |
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committer | Rob Landley <rob@landley.net> | 2014-09-26 18:49:44 -0500 |
commit | e0d8009d76b3a2451cb6c6ed2b241c7eff06ed60 (patch) | |
tree | f2904430b0cb86f7b7a2721ae2ddd60fcf727166 | |
parent | e1fa787be8d0d66c9860c86dcb80fd6e096f74e0 (diff) | |
download | toybox-e0d8009d76b3a2451cb6c6ed2b241c7eff06ed60.tar.gz |
The only illegal characters in a username are ":" (field separator), "\n" (line separator), and "/" (filename separator).
Restricting usernames to the legacy posix character allowed set (for filenames,
so the $HOME directory is creatable on VFAT and similar) means you can't have
UTF-8 usernames. Linux allows any character but / and NUL in filenames.
Since root is creating these entries, we assume root knows what it's doing.
-rw-r--r-- | lib/password.c | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/pending.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | toys/pending/groupadd.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | toys/pending/useradd.c | 4 |
4 files changed, 8 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/lib/password.c b/lib/password.c index 2578dfe0..40cbead0 100644 --- a/lib/password.c +++ b/lib/password.c @@ -19,11 +19,7 @@ int get_salt(char *salt, char *algo) int len = al[i].len; char *s = salt; - if (al[i].id) { - *s++ = '$'; - *s++ = '0'+al[i].id; - *s++ = '$'; - } + if (al[i].id) s += sprintf(s, "$%c$", '0'+al[i].id); // Read appropriate number of random bytes for salt i = xopen("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); @@ -233,29 +229,3 @@ free_storage: free(filenamesfx); return ret; } - -void is_valid_username(const char *name) -{ - regex_t rp; - regmatch_t rm[1]; - int eval; - char *regex = "^[_.A-Za-z0-9][-_.A-Za-z0-9]*"; //User name REGEX - - xregcomp(&rp, regex, REG_NEWLINE); - - /* compare string against pattern -- remember that patterns - are anchored to the beginning of the line */ - eval = regexec(&rp, name, 1, rm, 0); - regfree(&rp); - if (!eval && !rm[0].rm_so) { - int len = strlen(name); - if ((rm[0].rm_eo == len) || - (rm[0].rm_eo == len - 1 && name[len - 1] == '$')) { - if (len >= LOGIN_NAME_MAX) error_exit("name is too long"); - else return; - } - } - error_exit("'%s', not valid %sname",name, - (((toys.which->name[3] == 'g') || - (toys.which->name[0] == 'g'))? "group" : "user")); -} diff --git a/lib/pending.h b/lib/pending.h index c98bb514..c67d81c8 100644 --- a/lib/pending.h +++ b/lib/pending.h @@ -2,6 +2,5 @@ // password.c #define MAX_SALT_LEN 20 //3 for id, 16 for key, 1 for '\0' -void is_valid_username(const char *name); int read_password(char * buff, int buflen, char* mesg); int update_password(char *filename, char* username, char* encrypted); diff --git a/toys/pending/groupadd.c b/toys/pending/groupadd.c index 04c31ee5..7df0a5c3 100644 --- a/toys/pending/groupadd.c +++ b/toys/pending/groupadd.c @@ -92,11 +92,12 @@ void groupadd_main(void) update_password(SECURE_GROUP_PATH, grp->gr_name, entry); free(entry); } else { //new group to be created + char *s = *toys.optargs; + /* investigate the group to be created */ - if ((grp = getgrnam(*toys.optargs))) - error_exit("group '%s' is in use", *toys.optargs); - setlocale(LC_ALL, "C"); - is_valid_username(*toys.optargs); + if (getgrnam(s)) error_exit("'%s' in use", s); + if (s[strcspn(s, ":/\n")] || strlen(s) > LOGIN_NAME_MAX) + error_exit("bad name"); new_group(); } } diff --git a/toys/pending/useradd.c b/toys/pending/useradd.c index 9f1fa4c5..4f2bcc61 100644 --- a/toys/pending/useradd.c +++ b/toys/pending/useradd.c @@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ void useradd_main(void) } // Sanity check user to add - if (strchr(s, ':') || strchr(s, '/') || strlen(s) > LOGIN_NAME_MAX) - error_exit("bad name"); + if (s[strcspn(s, ":/\n")] || strlen(s) > LOGIN_NAME_MAX) + error_exit("bad username"); // race condition: two adds at same time? if (getpwnam(s)) error_exit("'%s' in use", s); |