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authorDenys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>2016-03-30 17:27:32 +0200
committerDenys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>2016-03-30 17:27:32 +0200
commit32c08acba3d938ec2fa4f9d2ff8160bbe05a20cb (patch)
tree9fd750c4bf521a9d59fd2973348ebbefc24c5fe7 /loginutils
parent8ac6effb029f1fe4f620e061c1b62c4721f41491 (diff)
downloadbusybox-32c08acba3d938ec2fa4f9d2ff8160bbe05a20cb.tar.gz
sulogin: remove suid paranoia code, explain why it's not necessary
function old new delta sulogin_main 325 270 -55 Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'loginutils')
-rw-r--r--loginutils/sulogin.c22
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/loginutils/sulogin.c b/loginutils/sulogin.c
index d2ac1f65d..33f078ae7 100644
--- a/loginutils/sulogin.c
+++ b/loginutils/sulogin.c
@@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
struct passwd *pwd;
const char *shell;
+ /* Note: sulogin is not a suid app. It is meant to be run by init
+ * for single user / emergency mode. init starts it as root.
+ * Normal users (potentially malisious ones) can only run it under
+ * their UID, therefore no paranoia here is warranted:
+ * $LD_LIBRARY_PATH in env, TTY = /dev/sda
+ * are no more dangerous here than in e.g. cp applet.
+ */
+
logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
@@ -47,18 +55,9 @@ int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
dup(0);
}
- /* Malicious use like "sulogin /dev/sda"? */
- if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
- logmode = LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
- bb_error_msg_and_die("not a tty");
- }
-
- /* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */
- sanitize_env_if_suid();
-
pwd = getpwuid(0);
if (!pwd) {
- goto auth_error;
+ bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for root");
}
while (1) {
@@ -92,7 +91,4 @@ int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
/* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */
run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL);
-
- auth_error:
- bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for root");
}