diff options
author | Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> | 2017-04-13 12:57:04 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> | 2017-04-13 12:57:04 +0200 |
commit | 335681ca8e39144fa19814f7ba10d0fe760e4055 (patch) | |
tree | 81c20a0be3daab564c842f510126037bf2331ab2 /loginutils | |
parent | 517a82c5b6b5e279f3e96a6774445a2952ca312b (diff) | |
download | busybox-335681ca8e39144fa19814f7ba10d0fe760e4055.tar.gz |
su: FEATURE_SU_BLANK_PW_NEEDS_SECURE_TTY
When this feature is enabled, blank passwords are not accepted by su
unless the user is on a secure TTY defined in /etc/securetty. This
resembles the default PAM configuration of some Linux distros which
specify the nullok_secure option for pam_unix.so.
Based on patch by Kaarle Ritvanen <kaarle.ritvanen@datakunkku.fi>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'loginutils')
-rw-r--r-- | loginutils/su.c | 27 |
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/loginutils/su.c b/loginutils/su.c index d04b85fb1..f2cd799ae 100644 --- a/loginutils/su.c +++ b/loginutils/su.c @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ //config: bool "If user's shell is not in /etc/shells, disallow -s PROG" //config: default y //config: depends on SU +//config: +//config:config FEATURE_SU_BLANK_PW_NEEDS_SECURE_TTY +//config: bool "Disallow blank passwords from TTYs other than specified in /etc/securetty" +//config: default n +//config: depends on SU //applet:/* Needs to be run by root or be suid root - needs to change uid and gid: */ //applet:IF_SU(APPLET(su, BB_DIR_BIN, BB_SUID_REQUIRE)) @@ -79,6 +84,7 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) char user_buf[64]; #endif const char *old_user; + int r; /* Note: we don't use "'+': stop at first non-option" idiom here. * For su, "SCRIPT ARGS" or "-c CMD ARGS" do not stop option parsing: @@ -99,6 +105,11 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) argv++; } + tty = xmalloc_ttyname(STDIN_FILENO); + if (!tty) + tty = "none"; + tty = skip_dev_pfx(tty); + if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) { /* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to * identify the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell. @@ -112,20 +123,26 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) pw = getpwuid(cur_uid); old_user = pw ? xstrdup(pw->pw_name) : ""; } - tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2); - if (!tty) { - tty = "none"; - } openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH); } pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username); - if (cur_uid == 0 || ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) { + r = 1; + if (cur_uid != 0) + r = ask_and_check_password(pw); + if (r > 0) { + if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_BLANK_PW_NEEDS_SECURE_TTY + && r == CHECKPASS_PW_HAS_EMPTY_PASSWORD + && !check_securetty(tty) + ) { + goto fail; + } if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s", '+', tty, old_user, opt_username); } else { + fail: if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s", '-', tty, old_user, opt_username); |