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authorRobert Griebl <griebl@gmx.de>2002-06-04 20:45:46 +0000
committerRobert Griebl <griebl@gmx.de>2002-06-04 20:45:46 +0000
commit1fca558799350fb6caff97f55aa6d1237b08fccb (patch)
treebd211c50ca4a34fd4c6317696c62564fb77171e9 /loginutils/su.c
parentea1a63a2011a44b143cc46c7d80a8152f5358e24 (diff)
downloadbusybox-1fca558799350fb6caff97f55aa6d1237b08fccb.tar.gz
Bigger patch for (partial) tinylogin integration
- Made a new dir loginutils - Moved all applets from pwd_grp to loginutils - Added new applets su.c login.c to loginutils - Made a new dir libpwdgrp - Moved everything from pwd_grp/libpwd_grp there - Added shadow.c to libpwdgrp - Removed dir pwd_grp - Added usage strings for login and su to usage.h - Changed main Makefile to reflect the dir rearrangements [Parts of this patch may overlap with my other two patches]
Diffstat (limited to 'loginutils/su.c')
-rw-r--r--loginutils/su.c167
1 files changed, 167 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/loginutils/su.c b/loginutils/su.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33e62e837
--- /dev/null
+++ b/loginutils/su.c
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */
+
+#include "busybox.h"
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "pwd.h"
+#include "grp.h"
+
+#include "tinylogin.h"
+
+
+
+/* The shell to run if none is given in the user's passwd entry. */
+#define DEFAULT_SHELL "/bin/sh"
+#define DEFAULT_USER "root"
+
+//#define SYSLOG_SUCCESS
+#define SYSLOG_FAILURE
+
+
+#if defined( SYSLOG_SUCCESS ) || defined( SYSLOG_FAILURE )
+/* Log the fact that someone has run su to the user given by PW;
+ if SUCCESSFUL is nonzero, they gave the correct password, etc. */
+
+static void log_su ( const struct passwd *pw, int successful )
+{
+ const char *old_user, *tty;
+
+#if !defined( SYSLOG_SUCESS )
+ if ( successful )
+ return;
+#endif
+#if !defined( SYSLOG_FAILURE )
+ if ( !successful )
+ return;
+#endif
+
+ if ( pw-> pw_uid ) // not to root -> ignored
+ return;
+
+ /* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to identify
+ the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell. */
+ old_user = getlogin ( );
+ if ( !old_user ) {
+ /* getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry. Resort to getpwuid. */
+ struct passwd *pwd = getpwuid ( getuid ( ));
+ old_user = ( pwd ? pwd-> pw_name : "" );
+ }
+
+ tty = ttyname ( 2 );
+
+ openlog ( "su", 0, LOG_AUTH );
+ syslog ( LOG_NOTICE, "%s%s on %s", successful ? "" : "FAILED SU ", old_user, tty ? tty : "none" );
+}
+#endif
+
+
+
+int su_main ( int argc, char **argv )
+{
+ int flag;
+ int opt_preserve = 0;
+ int opt_loginshell = 0;
+ char *opt_shell = 0;
+ char *opt_command = 0;
+ char *opt_username = DEFAULT_USER;
+ char **opt_args = 0;
+ struct passwd *pw, pw_copy;
+
+
+ while (( flag = getopt ( argc, argv, "c:lmps:" )) != -1 ) {
+ switch ( flag ) {
+ case 'c':
+ opt_command = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ case 'p':
+ opt_preserve = 1;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ opt_shell = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ opt_loginshell = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ show_usage ( );
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (( optind < argc ) && ( argv [optind][0] == '-' ) && ( argv [optind][1] == 0 )) {
+ opt_loginshell = 1;
+ ++optind;
+ }
+
+ /* get user if specified */
+ if ( optind < argc )
+ opt_username = argv [optind++];
+
+ if ( optind < argc )
+ opt_args = argv + optind;
+
+
+ pw = getpwnam ( opt_username );
+ if ( !pw )
+ error_msg_and_die ( "user %s does not exist", opt_username );
+
+ /* Make sure pw->pw_shell is non-NULL. It may be NULL when NEW_USER
+ is a username that is retrieved via NIS (YP), but that doesn't have
+ a default shell listed. */
+ if ( !pw-> pw_shell || !pw->pw_shell [0] )
+ pw-> pw_shell = (char *) DEFAULT_SHELL;
+
+ /* Make a copy of the password information and point pw at the local
+ copy instead. Otherwise, some systems (e.g. Linux) would clobber
+ the static data through the getlogin call from log_su. */
+ pw_copy = *pw;
+ pw = &pw_copy;
+ pw-> pw_name = xstrdup ( pw-> pw_name );
+ pw-> pw_dir = xstrdup ( pw-> pw_dir );
+ pw-> pw_shell = xstrdup ( pw-> pw_shell );
+
+ if (( getuid ( ) == 0 ) || correct_password ( pw ))
+ log_su ( pw, 1 );
+ else {
+ log_su ( pw, 0 );
+ error_msg_and_die ( "incorrect password" );
+ }
+
+ if ( !opt_shell && opt_preserve )
+ opt_shell = getenv ( "SHELL" );
+
+ if ( opt_shell && getuid ( ) && restricted_shell ( pw-> pw_shell ))
+ {
+ /* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is
+ probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't
+ compromise the account by allowing access with a standard
+ shell. */
+ fputs ( "using restricted shell\n", stderr );
+ opt_shell = 0;
+ }
+
+ if ( !opt_shell )
+ opt_shell = xstrdup ( pw-> pw_shell );
+
+ change_identity ( pw );
+ setup_environment ( opt_shell, opt_loginshell, !opt_preserve, pw );
+ run_shell ( opt_shell, opt_loginshell, opt_command, opt_args );
+
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+}